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FOREWORD
In recent years, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) has been widely recognized as a more dangerous regional and international terrorist organization
than the original al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden
until his 2011 death. AQAP (which Yemenis simply
call al-Qaeda) grew out of the original al-Qaeda group
and maintains a radical outlook based heavily on bin
Laden’s extremist ideology. This radical group became
prominent in the early 2000s when it began terrorist
operations in Saudi Arabia, although it was ultimately
defeated in that country. Following this defeat, AQAP
retained its name and re-grouped in Yemen, merging
with the local al-Qaeda organization operating there.
In Yemen, AQAP was eventually able to present a
strong challenge to that country’s government. Over
time, the group was also able to become almost totally
independent of the original al-Qaeda, although it still
preserves a public veneer of subordination. These
developments, as well as the lessons from and future
of the AQAP threat, are considered in depth in this
monograph by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.
Dr. Terrill uses this monograph to explore how
Yemen’s “Arab Spring” uprising paralyzed that country’s government and shattered its military into hostile factions for over a year beginning in early 2011.
This prolonged crisis prevented Yemen’s government,
under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, from doing much
more than attempting to survive. Saleh used those
military units that remained loyal to him for regime
protection against anti-government demonstrators
and troops who defected to those demonstrators. The
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uprising subsequently led to a security vacuum that
helped allow AQAP and its insurgent force, Ansar
al-Shariah, to expand their activities beyond terrorism due to the government’s preoccupation with the
Arab Spring. Although AQAP and the Arab Spring
demonstrators felt no kinship towards each other,
AQAP was more than willing to take advantage of
the disorder produced by the uprising. In this new
security environment, the militants were able to seize
and hold significant amounts of territory in southern
Yemen. Despite this focus on capturing territory, Dr.
Terrill also notes that AQAP has remained interested
in striking at U.S. interests in Yemen and especially in
implementing spectacular acts of terrorism against the
U.S. homeland.
Dr. Terrill pays special attention to the role of Yemen’s current reform President Abed Rabbu Hadi,
who succeeded President Saleh in early 2012 after a
special election. In the war against AQAP, Hadi has
made considerable progress, most notably by using
Yemen’s military to drive the insurgents out of their
southern strongholds. In considering these events, Dr.
Terrill provides a thoughtful and nuanced discussion
of the controversial issue of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), more widely known as drones. This monograph notes that both the United States and Yemeni
governments now acknowledge that these systems
are being used over Yemen, and President Hadi has
discussed their use in considerable depth. While this
monograph acknowledges many legitimate concerns
about the use of U.S. drones in Yemen, it still clearly
endorses them as an interim measure while the Yemeni military is in the process of reorganization and rebuilding. Dr. Terrill contends, however, that the long-
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term solution is the development of Yemeni military
and police forces that can address all internal threats
without depending upon U.S. assets.
Dr. Terrill further considers the problems that Yemen continues to face in restructuring its military and
especially the ground forces so that they can contain,
marginalize, and destroy AQAP as an effective insurgent and terrorist force. Many of his insights have important implications for the use of Landpower by U.S.
partner nations. President Hadi’s efforts to rebuild the
Yemeni military have been particularly difficult because of the deep factionalism within these forces and
the presence of senior leaders with deep ties to the old
regime. Hadi, therefore, has proceeded forward in a
serious but incremental manner. This is an important
effort since AQAP remains a formidable force even
after being driven out of the southern urban centers.
Moreover, AQAP continues to strike at the government with hard-hitting raids and assassinations, and
is clearly seeking to make a comeback in southern Yemen at some point.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject while our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems
associated with the future of the Middle East and
the ongoing struggle against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S.
strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they
seek to address the complicated interplay of factors
related to regional security issues, fighting terrorism,
and the support of local allies. This work may also
benefit those seeking a greater understanding of longrange issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It
is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of
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all services, as well as other U.S. government officials
involved in military and security assistance planning.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In early 2011, the Arab world began going through
a process of systemic political change that initially
came to be known as the Arab Spring, although less
optimistic references were increasingly used to describe these developments over time. In this struggle,
which began in Tunisia and Egypt, a number of longstanding dictatorships were overthrown or at least
fundamentally challenged by frustrated citizens seeking an end to corruption and the abuses inherent in
an authoritarian state. Following the Tunisian and
Egyptian examples, Yemen rapidly experienced serious street unrest that was directed at the over 30-year
presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh struggled for
over a year to maintain power but was ultimately unable to do so in the face of an enraged public and international disapproval for the corruption and violence
of his regime. Under intense pressure, President Saleh
turned over governing authority to Vice President
Abed Rabbu Hadi in November 2011 under the conditions put forward by a Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) transitional document. He formally remained
president (without the powers of the office), until a
referendum-type election confirmed Hadi as his successor. As President Hadi took office in February 2012,
he faced not only serious demands for reform, but also
a strong and energized insurgency in southern Yemen. The al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
insurgency had no ties to the activities of the pro-democracy demonstrators, but it had flourished during
the year-long power struggle in the Yemeni capital of
Sanaa. Just as the AQAP insurgency was not linked to
the pro-democracy movement, it was also not closely
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linked to the larger al-Qaeda movement outside of
Yemen. Thus, with local leadership overseeing operations in Yemen, Osama bin Laden’s 2011 death was
not a serious blow to AQAP.
AQAP functioned primarily as a terrorist organization prior to 2010, but it later expanded its operations
to include efforts to capture, hold, and rule territory in
areas where the Yemeni government had only a limited ability to maintain security. This new strategy of
seizing and retaining territory was implemented prior
to the onset of the Arab Spring, although it was later
accelerated due to the Arab Spring-inspired turmoil
in Yemen. As Yemen became increasingly unstable,
it was racked by violence between the regime and its
opponents. In such an environment, AQAP used its
insurgent arm, Ansar al-Shariah (partisans of Islamic
law), to seize some promising opportunities to capture
and retain Yemeni territory while the government
was too absorbed in its own problems to respond in
a decisive manner. According to a variety of sources,
including Amnesty International, Ansar al-Shariah
implemented an array of extremely harsh punishments for any action that was viewed as an infraction
of their version of Islamic law. Such punishments included crucifixions, public beheadings, amputations,
and floggings.
In his February 2012 inauguration speech, Hadi
called for, “the continuation of the war against alQaeda as a religious and national duty.” AQAP responded to his assertiveness with considerable ferocity by striking Yemeni government targets with
suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism. These
strikes were made in order to further challenge the
government before Hadi could consolidate his authority. Even more significantly, AQAP won a major battle
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in southern Yemen during this time frame by attacking unprepared troops, most of whom appear to have
been asleep after posting inadequate security. Despite
this defeat, the government launched an offensive in
the summer of 2012 to remove AQAP and Ansar alShariah from the territory they had seized in southern
Yemen. The Yemeni offensive was conducted with a
force of around 20,000 regular army soldiers, supported by significant numbers of paid local tribal auxiliaries. Saudi Arabia provided considerable financial assistance to support the operation, and it appears that
a large share of the Saudi funds may have been used
to hire the tribal militia auxiliaries requested to support the army. These types of fighters have often been
highly effective in the kinds of combat that take place
in Yemen. In the face of this attack, AQAP fought back
proficiently and also conducted several spectacular
terrorist attacks in Sanaa. Fortunately, the military prevailed against this resistance, and AQAP forces were
ultimately driven from the urban areas that they had
previously occupied.
In the 2012 government offensive, the international press reported the widespread use of U.S. drones,
which, according to those same reports, may have
tipped the tide of battle by gathering intelligence and
serving to eliminate key insurgent leaders at important points in the campaign. While drone use has many
political drawbacks, the possibility that it helped determine the outcome of the summer offensive is worth
considering. If the Yemeni military had been defeated
by AQAP in this effort, the government might have
collapsed at an excruciatingly sensitive time, possibly
leaving the country in anarchy. Such a defeat would
also create the conditions for an even more deeply
rooted AQAP presence in southern Yemen, with no
countervailing Yemeni authority capable of moving
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against it. The success of the government’s southern
offensive would therefore seem to have been vitally
important to U.S. national interests in the region.
If Yemeni forces had failed, and particularly if they
had failed ignominiously, a newly energized terrorist movement could have plagued the region and
the world.
Unfortunately, despite the 2012 victory, the struggle for control of Yemen is still subject to uncertainty,
and an AQAP insurgent comeback there remains a disturbing possibility. Moreover, the use of U.S. drones
to ensure Yemeni security has already been seen to
be deeply unpopular among many Yemeni citizens.
Consequently, drones should not be treated as a longterm solution to that country’s security problems. A
more optimal long-term solution is a Yemeni military
that is capable of maintaining national security without the direct involvement of foreign forces. Military
reform, therefore, remains a vital aspect of dealing
with Yemen’s security issues. Yemeni forces are currently making some progress in this regard, and President Hadi has made a strong effort to modernize the
military’s structure and eliminate the warlord-style
leadership of some Yemeni commanders.
During the 2009-12 time frame, AQAP also maintained a vigorous effort to strike against the United
States, despite its increasing focus on expanding the
southern insurgency, and then resisting subsequent
government advances in that region. AQAP leaders
considered terrorist strikes against the United States
and efforts to defeat the Yemeni government as overlapping priorities despite the potential for a dissipation of resources with an overly ambitious agenda.
Additionally, AQAP leaders did not seem to fear
possible U.S. intervention with ground forces into Ye-
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men in the aftermath of such a strike and may even
have welcomed it. If the United States had invaded
Yemen in response to a spectacular terror strike, it is
almost certain that large elements of the population
would have been willing to fight any foreign invader,
no matter how valid the reason for intervention might
have been. In such circumstances, the U.S. leadership
would have an overwhelming need to strike back hard
and might easily choose the wrong way of doing so.
U.S. support for Yemen at this time of transition
remains important, and the United States must not regard the fight against AQAP as largely over because
of the 2012 defeat of insurgent forces in southern Yemen. AQAP remains a dangerous and effective force
despite these setbacks. Moreover, there are important
reasons for defeating AQAP and its allies in Yemen,
even if this does not destroy the organization and instead leads it to move operations to other prospective
sanctuaries in remote parts of the world. Yemen is one
of the worst places on earth to cede to terrorists due to
its key strategic location, including a long border with
Saudi Arabia. It also dominates one of the region’s key
waterways, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait which controls
access to the southern Red Sea. Outside of the region,
the problem of Yemen based-terrorism remains an important international threat which cannot be ignored.
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THE STRUGGLE FOR YEMEN
AND THE CHALLENGE OF AL-QAEDA
IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
The U.S. military has also been working closely with
the Yemeni government to operationally dismantle
and ultimately eliminate the terrorist threat posed by
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most
active and dangerous affiliate of al-Qaeda today. Our
joint efforts have resulted in direct action against a
limited number of AQAP operatives and senior leaders in that country who posed a terrorist threat to the
United States and our interests.
		
		

President Barack Obama1
June 2012

When the subject of Yemen comes up, it’s often
through the prism of the terrorist threat that is emanating from within its borders. And for good reason: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is
al-Qaida’s most active affiliate. It has assassinated
Yemeni leaders, murdered Yemeni citizens, kidnapped and killed aid workers, targeted American
interests, encouraged attacks in the United States and
attempted repeated attacks against U.S. aviation.
		
		
		

John O. Brennan2
Director of Central Intelligence
August 2012

The real battle against the terrorist al Qaeda organization [al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] has yet
to begin and will not end until we have eradicated
their presence in every district, village and position;
it will not end until internally displaced citizens are
assured that they can return safely to their homes and
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organized terrorist operatives have surrendered their
weapons and rid themselves of ideologies that contradict the sacred values of the Islamic religion.
Yemeni President Abed Rabbu Hadi3
May 2012

INTRODUCTION
In early 2011, the Arab world began going through
a process of systemic political change that initially
came to be known as the Arab Spring, although less
optimistic references were increasingly used to describe these developments over time. In this struggle, which began in Tunisia and Egypt, a number of
long-standing dictatorships were overthrown, or at
least fundamentally challenged by frustrated citizens
seeking an end to massive corruption and the other
abuses inherent in an authoritarian state. In the face of
these challenges, the Egyptian and Tunisian dictatorships fell rapidly and easily, thereby raising hopes in
neighboring countries that their own ossified leaderships could be ousted as a result of an outpouring of
street protests and other popular unrest. Nevertheless, when the excitement of these early victories over
authoritarian regimes spread to other Arab countries,
the revolutionaries were, in many cases, dramatically
less successful than their counterparts in Cairo and
Tunis. Unrest in Bahrain provoked a massive government crackdown which was assisted by other Sunni
Arab monarchies in the Gulf and particularly Saudi
Arabia. In the Levant, President Bashar Assad of Syria
implemented a strategy of massive brutality against
opponents in an effort to remain in power, seemingly
at all costs. The Libyan regime also attempted to crush
2

initially peaceful demonstrators by force, but it was
defeated by an armed popular uprising backed by
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airpower
and other forms of support. In the southern Arabian
Peninsula, the flames of unrest also inspired discontented citizens in Yemen, where the Arab Spring
quickly assumed many of the same features found in
Tunisia and Egypt. Yemeni citizens staged massive
civil unrest and called for the ouster of the regime of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After over 30 years as
president, Saleh’s ability to survive in power was legendary, but the ouster of long-serving dictators like
Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali clearly gave
his opponents hope. The Yemeni leader strongly resisted calls to step down, but did not have the internal
resources or foreign support to implement the same
level of military repression as occurred in a country
such as Syria.
Despite Saleh’s strong efforts to remain in power,
domestic and international pressures forced him from
office in February 2012 for reasons that will be discussed later. While the regime often seemed anemic
and frail, Saleh managed to retain power for over a
year after the collapse of the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes. During this time frame Yemen became increasingly unstable and racked by violence between the
regime and its opponents. In such an environment,
the terrorist group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), used its insurgent arm, Ansar al-Shariah
(partisans of Islamic law), to seize some promising
opportunities to capture and retain Yemeni territory.
This effort occurred while the government was too
absorbed in its own problems to respond in a decisive
manner. Throughout this period, Saleh often maintained that efforts to ease him from power could eas-
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ily lead to sweeping AQAP victories throughout the
country. While the doomsday scenario that Saleh predicted never occurred, AQAP did use Yemen’s unrest
to expand its control over most of Abyan province and
parts of other southern provinces. In the summer of
2012, a new Yemeni government pushed AQAP and
Ansar al-Shariah out of many of these strongholds,
but the battle for control of Yemen is still subject to
considerable uncertainty. An AQAP insurgent comeback remains a disturbing possibility. The context, history, and future of this struggle remain of tremendous
importance to the well-being of all states concerned,
with the threat presented by al-Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliate.
THE CRISIS IN YEMENI GOVERNANCE
Yemen is a large and important country within the
Middle East that has a long and porous border with
Saudi Arabia and direct access to key strategic waterways, including the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
It is currently the only nonmonarchy on the Arabian
Peninsula, as well as one of that region’s more heavily populated countries with around 24,000,000 people.4 The Yemeni population is currently growing by
around 3.45 percent per year, and is expected to reach
38 million in the next 15 years.5 Unfortunately, Yemen
is also afflicted with numerous severe internal difficulties, and a large portion of the Yemeni population
has problems with grinding poverty and malnutrition. Some sources state that the number of malnourished Yemeni children is around 750,000, with 500,000
of these children in danger of dying of starvation in
the near future.6 Yemen’s 2011-12 civil unrest has also
led to soaring prices for food and other staples as well
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as a breakdown of social services according to the
United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.7 Increasingly, the UN specialized agencies involved with supporting Yemen have
developed escalating concerns about the potential for
a serious famine.8 Water and electricity shortages are
also common in Yemen, and the capital city of Sanaa
faces the possibility of running out of water in the next
few years. The water that is available is often unsafe
to drink.
Yemen’s most important political figure from 19782012 was former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who
left office in February 2012 as the result of massive
and unrelenting domestic, regional, and international
pressure for him to resign. Saleh had become the president of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR-North Yemen)
in July 1978 and then established himself as the first
president of the Republic of Yemen which was formed
in 1990 when North and South Yemen (the Yemen
Arab Republic and the Peoples’ Democratic Republic
of Yemen [PDRY]) merged into one country.9 Saleh’s
longevity in power and his considerable ruthlessness
as president were useful, but never allowed him to
establish himself as the leader of a powerful and efficient autocratic regime. Yemeni tribes were too strong
and well-armed for this to occur easily. Reacting to his
circumstances and limitations, Saleh ruled by manipulating the often competing concerns of Yemen’s political factions, tribes, religious groups, and interested
outside powers, including Western and Gulf Arab nations willing to provide economic aid. In this system,
Saleh’s primary approach to governance centered on
his management of a network of patronage relationships and subsidies provided to friendly individuals,
families, and tribes in exchange for their support.10
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Saleh’s government sometimes used repression to enforce its policies, but this approach was often a last
resort which could not always be applied effectively
within strongly tribalized regions. Saleh’s Yemen consequently ran on a system of threats, subsidies, and
bribes, with tribal leaders having consistently shown
an interest in money that superseded concerns about
religion, ideology, and politics.11 Corruption permeated the system from the summit of political power
down to impoverished junior civil servants or soldiers
at checkpoints on Yemen’s roads.
While Saleh’s system of governance appeared unsustainable, the Yemeni leader managed to muddle
through until the eruption of the region-wide unrest
unleashed by the Arab Spring. To understand what
is happening in contemporary Yemen, it is necessary
to consider how Saleh lost the presidency, and what
forces were unleashed by the revolutionary activity
that eventually led to his ouster. As noted earlier, the
Arab world experienced a political earthquake that
began in 2011 with the unfolding of the Arab Spring.
The rapid and spectacular ouster of the Tunisian dictatorship in January 2011 stunned the Arab world and
raised the possibility that many other Arab regimes
were not as deeply entrenched as they might appear.
Tunisia’s revolution helped ignite an 18-day upheaval
in Egypt that led to President Mubarak’s forced resignation on March 11, 2011. Many Yemenis observing
these monumental events were deeply inspired by the
Tunisian Revolution and then displayed an increased
willingness to confront their own government after
Mubarak resigned.
The crisis in Yemeni governance reached a turning point on January 20, 2011, when mass demonstrations against the Saleh government began occurring
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throughout many of Yemen’s major cities. Like the Tunisians and Egyptians, Yemenis felt that their own autocratic regime had done little to improve their quality
of life in 33 years. Also, as in Egypt and Tunisia, many
Yemenis were angry about being victimized by the
staggeringly high levels of corruption in their country during the years of Saleh’s rule. Frighteningly, the
regime’s mismanagement and the economy’s downward spiral had no obvious end since President Saleh
appeared to be planning to install his son, Ahmed,
as president when he finally did retire. Such a power
transfer would have followed the emerging pattern of
father-son succession set by Syria in 2000 when Bashar
Assad succeeded his deceased father as president.
This approach would probably have been replicated
in Egypt and Libya had the pre-Arab Spring dictatorships survived in these countries. Additionally, before
his removal from power in the 2003 invasion, Saddam
Hussein appeared to be preparing his younger son,
Qusay, to become Iraq’s next president. This approach
to governance was widely and derisively referred to
as “republican monarchy” by detractors throughout
the Arab world.12 In this environment, the concept of
a Saleh family dynasty was widely unpopular with
many Yemenis, who were proud that they had replaced a monarchy with a republic in the 1960s.
President Saleh, despite his shortcomings, was
quick to recognize the threat to his regime presented by
the uprisings occurring elsewhere in the Arab world.
Following the overthrow of Tunisia’s dictatorship, he
quickly moved to get ahead of the potential for serious
unrest spreading to Yemen which had already started
to experience large but socially narrow demonstrations comprising mostly university students and opposition activists.13 As an initial move, he sought to
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shore up the loyalty of the security forces through a
series of promised public sector pay raises and other
benefits. Lower ranking civil servants were also promised increased remuneration to reduce the danger that
they could become a source of discontent. In a move
to contain campus unrest, Saleh exempted public university students from paying their remaining tuition
for the year. Then on February 2, he announced that
he would not seek re-election in 2013 when his presidential term expired and that his son Ahmed would
not run for president.14 This last set of promises, while
seemingly dramatic, appeared hollow due to his earlier efforts to eliminate presidential term limits just
prior to the outbreak of Arab Spring demonstrations
in Tunisia and Egypt. Many Yemenis saw the effort to
end presidential term limits as part of a Saleh plan to
establish himself as president for life. They likewise
expected him to return to that priority as soon as it
was practical to do so despite any promises he might
make at a time of crisis or political disadvantage.
Saleh’s efforts to contain the unrest, while shrewd,
did not prevent the escalation of demonstrations
against his rule as he had hoped. Expanding demonstrations were increasingly difficult for the security
forces to contain, and the Yemeni police began firing
shots into the air in an effort to break up the unrest.15
Additionally, as in Egypt, the government organized
counterdemonstrations designed to show popular support for the regime and to confront the demonstrators,
sometimes with broken bottles, daggers, and rocks.16
This countermove led to increased street violence
but in no way discouraged the protestors struggling
against the regime. As Saleh’s prospects for squelching
unrest appeared to dim, opportunistic Yemeni leaders whom he had either bribed or manipulated into
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supporting him, started to distance themselves from
the regime. These members of the Yemeni elite clearly
had no interest in going down with a collapsing government. In the face of the expanding power of the
opposition and the erosion of his own support, Saleh
continued using what repression he could manage, as
well as political maneuvering, to remain in power for
as long as possible.
The situation then exploded. Regime violence
against the demonstrators escalated dramatically on
March 18, 2011, when the government used plainclothes rooftop snipers to fire into urban crowds as a
way of breaking up anti-Saleh demonstrations. Fiftytwo protestors were killed in Sanaa on that day, with
serious casualties occurring in other Yemeni cities
such as Taiz, Yemen’s second largest city, 120 miles
from the capital.17 As the crisis continued, President
Saleh declared a state of emergency, and for the first
time deployed tanks into the streets to confront the
demonstrators.18 This massive escalation in regime
brutality and killings split the Yemeni government. On
March 21, Major General Ali Mohsen, the commander
of the northern military zone and the important First
Armored Brigade, changed sides and agreed to support the rebels. Prior to his defection, Mohsen was
widely regarded as the second most powerful figure
in the Yemeni regime. In accordance with the highly
personalistic nature of the Yemeni military system,
Mohsen’s troops remained loyal to him after he broke
with Saleh over the massacre. Additionally, a number
of other senior officers, including three other brigade
commanders, immediately rallied behind Ali Mohsen
and also defected.19 The regional and Yemeni media
estimated that around 40-60 percent of the army had
sided with the protesters, while some key units, in-
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cluding the Republican Guard, mostly remained loyal
to the regime.20 These troops had the best weapons
and equipment within the ground forces (including
Yemen’s most modern tanks). Estimates of troop loyalty at this point in time must be regarded as rough,
but do indicate a substantial division within the armed
forces. General Moshen also pledged that his troops
would defend demonstrators against regime violence.
In another blow to Saleh’s hopes for remaining in
power, Yemen’s most powerful tribal leader Sheikh
Sadeq al-Ahmar, head of the Hashid tribal confederation (Saleh’s own tribal confederation), also backed
the protestors. Sheikh Sadeq’s brother, Hamid al-Ahmar, a multimillionaire businessman and important
political leader, also emerged as an important source
of opposition.21 Adding to the president’s troubles, a
handful of members of parliament resigned in protest,
including former legislative allies of President Saleh
who were no longer willing to work with him. Surprisingly, Saleh appeared energized by his decision to
make a show of strength on March 18 and was publicly unfazed by the defections. Rather, he unleashed
a torrent of angry rhetoric against his opponents and
seemed to take comfort from a large pro-regime rally
in Sanaa that had been called in late March as a response to the activities of anti-regime protestors.22 It
seems possible that Saleh believed he had gained the
upper hand at this point despite the defections due to
his forceful acts of repression. He gave no sign of being willing to resign.
In this toxic environment, Yemen’s Gulf neighbors
became concerned about the escalating crisis in that
country and the prospects for spreading instability.
The leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states led by Saudi Arabia rapidly came to believe that
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Saleh would need to leave office for stability to return
to Yemen. They may also have assumed that Saleh
would prefer a comfortable retirement abroad rather
than risk his life attempting to stay in power against
increasingly long odds, and that he would therefore
be persuadable. Correspondingly, in late April, the
GCC offered a “road map” for Saleh’s safe exit from
power. The wealthy oil states within the GCC were
among Yemen’s most important sources of foreign
aid and consequently could not be ignored. Saleh attempted to appear cooperative with the GCC leaders
but was essentially playing for time and struggling to
remain president. He promised to sign the GCC initiative on three occasions, but then changed his mind
and refused to do so when the various promised dates
for signing the document arrived.23 The president’s
approach to the GCC Initiative was hardly surprising,
due to his opposition to leaving office and his hostility
toward the opposition. In April, Saleh made a speech
at the Yemeni Military Academy where he stated that
most of the opposition was composed of, “landgrabbers, smugglers of oil and gas, corrupt [officials,] and
fraudsters.”24 He also claimed that the opposition was
made up of “insurrectionists” who would drag the
country into chaos.25 Conversely, Saleh’s refusal to follow through on promises to sign the GCC agreement
only confirmed the opposition’s worst fears about his
intention to remain in power.26
Saleh also continued the brutality against street
demonstrators and may have hoped that he could
suppress the opposition to the point that international
pressure diminished if he reestablished control over
urban areas.27 Yemen’s second largest city, Taiz, was
a particularly militant center of anti-Saleh activity and
correspondingly experienced a great deal of punish-
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ment, including the use of artillery to shell residential areas where anti-regime rallies were being organized.28 In Sanaa, there were also occasional outbreaks
of fighting between pro-Saleh troops and armed members of the opposition, including troops loyal to General Ali Mohsen and tribal forces loyal to Sheikh Sadiq
al-Ahmar.29 Some of this fighting involved the use of
rockets, heavy shelling, and machine guns.30 These
flare-ups were usually brought under control by hastily arranged truces.
Yemen’s political situation changed dramatically
on June 3, when Saleh narrowly escaped assassination
as a result of a bomb explosion in a mosque inside the
presidential compound. The president was seriously
wounded during this incident, receiving both shrapnel wounds and serious burns. Additionally, several
officials with Saleh at the time were killed and a larger
number wounded. Saleh was flown to Riyadh shortly
after the attack for emergency medical treatment amid
speculation that he would not return due to Saudi
pressure on him to step down. Some Saudi officials,
speaking anonymously to the press, stated that the
president would either remain in Saudi Arabia or settle in a third country.31 Saleh’s departure from Yemen
and the possibility that he would remain in exile led
to a lull in street fighting in Sanaa, but it did not last.32
Moreover, if there was pressure on Saleh not to return
to Yemen, it was not effective, and Saleh unexpectedly traveled back on September 23 to resume his role
as president. He arrived on the 6th day of renewed
fighting in Sanaa, which was the worst violence there
since March.33
As the street confrontation raged, international
opposition to Saleh’s stalling tactics continued to
mount and placed additional pressure on the Yemeni
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president to leave office in accordance with his earlier
promises. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on October 21, calling upon Saleh to accept the
GCC agreement immediately and resign.34 Saleh could
not easily ignore this development since the Yemeni
economy depended highly on international goodwill
and aid. Finally, on November 23, 2011, after a great
deal of procrastination, Saleh signed the GCC initiative, and legally and bindingly agreed to step down
from office in exchange for an opposition agreement
not to prosecute him for any crimes that may have
been committed while he was in office. The Yemeni
president had struggled to avoid this outcome but also
feared that any further stalling could lead to wideranging UN sanctions being directed at him and his
family. Sanctions against individuals in cases such as
these generally involve freezing their overseas assets
and banning their foreign travel.35 Moreover, protester demands for Saleh’s prosecution for such things as
ordering the use of deadly force against the protesters
were sufficiently serious that the president may have
decided to accept immunity while it was still available. It was also widely suspected that Saleh would
have reneged on this agreement during the transitionary phase and remained in power if he had any opportunity to do so. Such an opportunity never arose.
President Saleh turned over presidential governing authority to his vice president immediately after
he signed the GCC plan in November 2011. He retained the title of president as an honorific that would
apply until the new president was installed by a referendum-type election (with one candidate) in February. As planned, Saleh was granted immunity from
prosecution for all crimes that he may have committed while in office. Opposition parliamentary leaders,
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however, were able to restrict the level of legal immunity provided to the former president’s relatives and
close associates within the regime. These individuals
can still be prosecuted on charges of terrorism, corruption, or the indiscriminate use of force.36 Many Yemenis were disappointed that Saleh would not be held
accountable for his actions including the crackdown
on dissent and the use of rooftop snipers. Others believed that immunity was an acceptable price to rid
Yemen of its strongman.37 The agreement did not specifically demand that Saleh leave Yemen permanently,
although U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton later
stated that there had been a quiet, informal agreement
that he was to do so, which he chose not to honor.38
The GCC-brokered agreement contained a number
of other provisions that went beyond Saleh’s resignation. It specified that a new government would be
formed with cabinet posts divided equally between
Saleh’s General Peoples’ Congress (GPC) party and a
host of opposition parties. The new president was to
be Abed Rabbu Hadi, Saleh’s long-serving vice president, who would be the only candidate in the February 2012 presidential election. The Yemeni Parliament
had made the decision that political and economic
conditions were too difficult for a contested election
to occur. Instead, a caretaker president with a 2-year
term would be installed, and the Constitution would
be rewritten, with competitive elections planned for
2014. The details for approaching the task of the new
Constitution are supposed to be worked out in a “National Dialogue” between the GPC and opposition
parties which are organized in a coalition known as
the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). Hadi also promised
to hold a referendum on a new Constitution within 18
months of his taking office.
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Balancing Hadi’s appointment, the new prime
minister was to be opposition politician Mohammed
Basindwa, a former foreign minister who had been a
member of the GPC but then left the party in the early
2000s. Since leaving the GPC, Basindwa has been a political independent. He had also been strongly critical
of the Saleh regime for the violence unleashed against
civilian demonstrators and maintained considerable
credibility with the Yemeni opposition.39 Nevertheless, Basindwa’s position as prime minister is clearly
inferior in power and prestige to Hadi’s position as
president, and Basindwa has much less significance
as a national figure. At the cabinet level, the GPC retained a number of key ministries including foreign
affairs, defense, and oil. The opposition received the
interior, finance, and education ministries.40
President Saleh left Yemen on January 22, 2012,
for additional medical treatment in the United States
to address lingering health problems associated with
the mosque bombing in June. It is not clear how much
overseas medical treatment was actually necessary,
but many involved parties wanted Saleh out of that
country during the election and while Vice President
Hadi was preparing to enter office as the new president. In a speech given shortly before going to the
United States, Saleh asked the Yemeni people for forgiveness for his “shortcomings” and stated that it was
time for him to relinquish power.41 More ominously,
he also stated that, “I will go to the U.S. for treatment
and then return as head of the GPC (which remained
legal),” thus indicating his plan to continue to play an
important political role in Yemeni politics.42 He clearly
meant these words and returned to Yemen on February 25, 2012, the same day as his successor was sworn
into office. One day before the elections, Saleh had
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called upon his supporters to vote for Hadi, although
this move was of limited significance, since there was
only one name on the ballot.43 Hadi thus was elected
head of state but did not become the leader of the GPC,
the political party to which he belonged.
Yet, if Saleh expected Hadi to act as a puppet, he
must have been crushingly disappointed. Hadi seemed
to understand that Saleh was now too divisive a figure
to ever return to power, and, despite their many years
together, he showed no interest in enabling him to do
so, or to collaborate with him in leading Yemen. A
central reason for Hadi’s efforts to marginalize Saleh
clearly involved the March 2011 massacre and the
political significance of the blood on the former president’s hands. In a statement that probably reflected
more anger than accuracy, Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights released casualty figures on the total conflict in March 2012, stating that more than 2,000 people
were killed in the turmoil surrounding the upheaval
and around 22,000 were wounded.44 This number was
significantly larger than the over 270 killed reported
by Human Rights Watch.45 Both the Yemeni government and Human Rights Watch included a significant
number of children in their casualty figures.
The Potential and Problems of the Hadi
Government.
Yemen’s February 21 presidential election was
problematic since Vice President Abed-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was the only candidate on the ballot, and
the process could therefore be viewed with some
skepticism. Under these constrained circumstances,
the most important question for the new regime’s future legitimacy rapidly became what kind of turnout
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could be expected. Fortunately, the electoral turnout
at 63-65 percent of registered voters was more than
respectable, especially when considering that various groups—including secessionists in the south and
the Houthi movement in the north—had called for an
election boycott.46 Following the election, Hadi was
quickly inaugurated as president on February 25, 2012.
At this point, a fundamental change had occurred in
Yemeni politics. Whatever its shortcomings, the election confirmed Saleh’s departure from office and his
new status as an ex-president.
Hadi is a former general who, at 67 years old (date
of birth, September 1, 1945), is only slightly younger
than former President Saleh. He served as Saleh’s vice
president for 18 years, partially because Saleh wanted
to showcase a few high ranking southerners (with no
power base of their own) in a government dominated by northerners such as himself. Hadi grew up in
the southern province of Abyan in the former PDRY
and became an officer serving in the southern army
when that part of Yemen was an independent country. In 1986, he and his troops fled to North Yemen
in response to a coup d’état by military rivals in Aden.
This coup was particularly bloody, and Hadi would
almost certainly have been executed had the plotters
been able to capture him. Later, Hadi’s status as an
exile changed when the two Yemen’s merged in 1990,
although he remained a loyal supporter of the Saleh
government. This loyalty was underscored in 1994
when he played a prominent role in crushing the effort
by southern Yemen to secede from the unified state.47
Although one of the key reasons Hadi was initially
selected as vice president centered on his status as a
southerner, he remains widely distrusted in the south
for his high profile role in defeating the 1994 bid to
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reestablish southern independence.48 On the positive
side, according to the Yemen Times, Hadi was widely
respected at the time he entered office, “due largely to
a perception that he kept his hands clean of political
and moral corruption.”49 Some friendly sources also
report that he distrusts tribalism and favors placing
technocrats in high ranking positions.50 While such
statements sound like image polishing, they are also
consistent with Hadi’s upbringing in southern Yemen, where the Marxist government officially viewed
tribalism as backward, although they were never able
to rise above it.
President Hadi correspondingly did not begin his
presidency with a strong, tribal, regional, or political
power base, which may have been another reason that
Saleh was comfortable placing him in his previous position of vice president. This weakness may also have
been one of the reasons he was chosen as a transitional
president, since various political factions may have assumed that he lacked the support to move beyond his
constitutional role and attempt to establish a dictatorship. Saleh, for his part, may have viewed Hadi as a
weak successor whom he could manipulate, perhaps
through the GPC. As noted, Hadi is a member of the
GPC, but Saleh remains the head of that organization.
In March 2012, Saleh began using the GPC post as the
basis for injecting himself back into Yemeni politics in
ways that have troubled the Hadi presidency.51 Early
in the Hadi administration, Saleh was also described
as holding almost daily meetings with security and
political officials, despite his lack of any governmental
position.52 Some Yemeni observers even went so far
as to call him a parallel ruler or even suggest that he
was controlling key events behind the scenes.53 Saleh
was also reported to be making a strong effort to en-
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sure that his own supporters remained in office and
was sometimes described as ordering his loyalists to
ignore Hadi’s presidential decrees when they threatened the interest of regime holdovers.54 To help bring
this situation under control, the U.S. embassy in Sanaa
issued a statement in March, saying that “it is not acceptable for any party to interfere in the implementation” of the GCC agreement. Saleh denounced the
statement, which he correctly understood as directed
at him and could not be separated from earlier threats
of sanctions against him and his political allies.55
Hadi also inherited a governmental system with a
significant number of Saleh holdovers in his cabinet
and in other key positions throughout the administrative apparatus and security services. As noted, the
GCC-sponsored power transfer agreement specified
that the GPC would retain half of the seats in the cabinet, and some of these people were more loyal to Saleh
than to Hadi. Moreover, during his time in office, President Saleh, like many autocrats, placed his relatives,
as well as members of his Sahhan tribe (of the Hashid
confederation), in a number of key national security
positions in order to protect the regime. Some of these
individuals remained in office for a while, although
their political futures were clearly in danger. The most
important holdover of the old regime was Brigadier
General Ahmed Ali Saleh, the former president’s oldest son, who remained the commander of Yemen’s
elite Republican Guard force for a while, although his
command was eventually abolished, leaving his future in considerable doubt.
Yet, if Hadi’s internal power base was uncertain, he
has consistently received the support of Yemen’s most
important foreign allies. The GCC countries, which
brokered the power transition agreement, are particu-
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larly important sources of foreign aid and investment
to Yemen. Saudi Arabia has been Yemen’s leading
source of economic aid over the last several years and
remains strongly involved with efforts to support the
Yemeni economy. In the aftermath of Hadi’s election,
Riyadh has stepped up aid to Yemen to help the new
government cope with its ongoing economic problems.56 The United States, the United Kingdom (UK),
and the European Union (EU) also backed Hadi and
supported the GCC’s Yemen Initiative.57 Hadi’s support from foreign countries concerned about AQAP
can only increase as a result of his strong military efforts against this group, which are discussed later.
As the political break between Hadi and Saleh became more prominent, the former president widely
denounced the government as “incompetent.”58 Some
observers also suggested that he was working behind
the scenes to undermine the Hadi government in
the hopes that he could then find a way to return to
power, following a Hadi failure. 59 Along with the EU
and the GCC, the U.S. leadership took a dim view of
Saleh’s efforts to disrupt the Yemeni government. In
response to the problem, President Obama followed
up on earlier warnings and issued an executive order
to freeze the U.S.-based assets of any individual who
sought to obstruct the implementation of the GCC
plan or “threaten the peace, security, and stability”
of Yemen.60 This order put a sanctions mechanism
in place, which could be activated on short notice if
necessary. While no names were mentioned, the order
was clearly in direct response to the problems created
by Saleh and his supporters. This action unquestionably strengthened Hadi’s position.
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Hadi’s government, for all of its later strengths in
fighting terrorism, has some clear shortcomings. As
noted, the new Yemeni president has only a limited
internal power base, and he has, therefore, on occasion attempted to expand it, using the traditional
tools of patronage and favoritism.61 This effort hardly
reflects a fundamental change in the Yemeni political
system and also may detract from any future effort at
institution building. Likewise, the endemic corruption
that helped produce the Arab Spring in Yemen and
elsewhere remains largely unaddressed. Over time,
Hadi and his successors may be able to do more to
strengthen Yemeni governmental institutions if they
wish to do so, but any such effort in the near future
would probably be impossible due to Hadi’s relatively weak position and the myriad of other problems he
needs to address.
THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT
OF AQAP
Yemen, as well as Yemeni citizens abroad, have
been prominent in the history of al-Qaeda and later
its regional affiliate, AQAP, since the emergence of
these terrorist groups as threats to Middle Eastern and
global security. Among Yemenis and in the Yemeni
press, AQAP is almost never referred to by that name.
Rather, Yemenis almost universally refer to the AQAP
organization simply as al-Qaeda. To many Yemenis,
distinctions between al-Qaeda and AQAP seem artificial and unnecessary. There are some understandable
reasons for this outlook. AQAP members frequently
pledge loyalty to “al-Qaeda central,” and the AQAP
leadership had explicitly pledged loyalty to that organization, with bin Laden as its leader. Moreover, after
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an appropriately respectful period of time following
bin Laden’s death, AQAP leader Nasser al-Wahayshi
pledged his personal and organizational allegiance to
bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.62 At least
at the level of formality and ritual, AQAP is a subordinate organization to al-Qaeda, although the truth is
more complex, as will be discussed herein. Additionally, Yemenis and the Yemeni press seldom refer to
AQAP’s insurgent force, Ansar al-Shariah, as a separate entity. Instead, they describe these forces simply
as members of al-Qaeda. As will be illustrated later,
Ansar al-Shariah is not separate from AQAP. While
Ansar al-Shariah acted as a front organization for
AQAP early in its existence, this pretense has largely been given up, and its lack of independence from
AQAP is no longer hidden.
Yemen has also been described as a near ideal jihadi sanctuary by a number of al-Qaeda writers from
Abu Musab al-Suri to Osama bin Laden.63 Numerous
ideological and military works by jihadist strategists
comment on Yemen’s value as a sanctuary based on
its large rural population, rugged terrain, highly independent tribes, and other factors. During the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, a number of young Yemenis
participated in the fighting and entered bin Laden’s
circle of influence, often remaining loyal to him for
years afterwards. Yemeni authorities usually viewed
this situation as manageable and not particularly
troubling in the short-term aftermath of their return.
Throughout the early 1990s, Yemeni political culture
viewed jihad against Soviet communists as a respectable undertaking, and returning fighters were often
seen in a positive light. Additionally, many of the
young jihadists had left Yemen due to that country’s
severe problems with unemployment, and Yemen’s
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political leadership therefore expected that these individuals could be co-opted with government jobs upon
their return. During this time frame, Western nations
showed little concern about the actions of former antiSoviet fighters, while other governments were also
slow to recognize the potential dangers presented by
Afghanistan veterans in Yemen.
After Yemeni unification, in May 1990, President
Saleh viewed the Islamist veterans of the SovietAfghan war as a useful counterweight to southern
Marxists in his political approach of playing conflicting groups against each other in order to remain in
power. The value of these hardened fighters to the
Saleh government later skyrocketed when up to three
brigades of tough and experienced Yemeni jihadists
were employed as auxiliaries of the Yemeni army during the 1994 civil war. This force made an important
contribution to the rapid northern victory against
southern secessionists, and many of the jihadists were
rewarded with military, security, and other government positions after the war ended.64 Others left Yemen, and some volunteered to join al-Qaeda in the
ongoing Afghan civil war on the side of the Taliban.65
Some jihadists who remained in Yemen stayed in
contact with other Islamist radicals outside the country and were interested in future armed conflicts that
went beyond fighting Soviet and Afghan communists.
Al-Qaeda, which is believed to have maintained a
meaningful presence in Yemen since at least the early
1990s, was especially interested in striking at the United States. Their first terrorist attack against Westerners may have been a coordinated strike at two Aden
hotels in 1992. These attacks were apparently aimed
at killing American soldiers traveling to their duty
station in Somalia, but instead killed an Australian
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tourist and two Yemenis.66 Al-Qaeda’s Yemen-based
operatives are widely believed to have provided some
support for the August 7, 1998, terrorist bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, although
no Yemenis directly participated in the attacks.67 The
most well-known attack at this stage of the conflict
was the al-Qaeda strike against the destroyer USS
Cole on October 12, 2000.68 While the USS Cole was
not sunk in the attack, it did have a large hole torn
open on one side, and 17 sailors were killed, with 40
wounded. Yemen provided some cooperation in the
U.S. effort to investigate the aftermath of this strike,
but investigators viewed this support as grudging and
circumscribed due to Saleh’s efforts to avoid stirring
up domestic unrest among anti-American elements of
the population.
As the Bush administration considered whether
Yemen was a potential security partner or an adversary in the aftermath of the USS Cole investigation,
al-Qaeda carried out the spectacular strike against the
World Trade Center’s twin towers and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Under these dramatically changed circumstances, President Saleh quickly
understood that lenient treatment of Islamist radicals
was now antithetical to his interests. Instead, he rapidly opted for an increasingly solid alignment with
Washington in the struggle against al-Qaeda and
quickly deported a number of foreign suspected radicals who had come to Yemen to study Islam.69 Even
more significantly, six al-Qaeda terrorists, including
several key leaders in the Marib province, were killed
in November 2002 in what the Yemeni government
has now admitted to have been an authorized U.S.
Predator drone attack.70 Among the dead was Qaid
Sinan al-Harithi, the head of the al-Qaeda branch
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which was then known as al-Qaeda in Yemen. By
November 2003, Yemeni security forces had captured
Muhammed al-Ahdal, who was then al-Harithi’s replacement as the head of al-Qaeda in Yemen.71 In 2004,
with the al-Qaeda problem seemingly contained if not
extinguished, the Yemeni government became much
more focused on its conflict with rebellious Houthi
tribesmen in northern Sa’ada province, while Washington directed its attention at problems associated
with managing violence in post-Saddam Iraq.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 strikes, Saleh was
forced to cope with an increasingly turbulent regional
environment, including domestic discontent created
by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Like Afghanistan,
post-Saddam Iraq became an important magnet and
training ground for Yemeni radicals. The approximate
number of Yemenis who fought in Iraq as supporters
of al-Qaeda is uncertain, but many were given ample
opportunity to wage war in that country if they wished
to do so. 72 Some estimates suggest that as many as
2,000 Yemeni fighters participated in the fighting for
the first 7 years of the war, but this figure seems high
considering that the total number of non-Iraqi jihadists was seldom more than 300 at any one time, according to most reliable estimates.73 Following this
highly unpopular invasion, the Yemeni government
chose not to challenge various radical clerics, including the prominent Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani,
who openly encouraged young men to travel to Iraq
to join the fighting.74
Difficulties with al-Qaeda forces in Yemen revived
around 2006. One of the reasons most frequently
given for this change is that a group of 23 experienced and resourceful terrorists conducted a mass
escape from a Yemeni Political Security Organization
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(PSO) prison in February 2006. The 2006 prison break
has often been treated as the key event for the revitalization of an increasingly autonomous al-Qaeda
in Yemen, but this evaluation is probably mistaken.
In this regard, only a limited number of individuals
were involved in the escape, and only of few of the
escaped terrorists had much chance to cause serious problems after their escape. Within a year of the
prison break, six of them were dead, and 11 had been
returned to custody. Only six of the former prisoners
remained at large in Yemen.75 Consequently, however
effective these remaining terrorists might be, there
remains a clear need to look for additional factors
in al-Qaeda’s revitalization within Yemen. It is, for
example, apparent that Yemeni jihadists returning
from Iraq played a major role in revitalizing al-Qaeda
in Yemen.76
Another factor of much greater importance than
the 2006 prison break in al-Qaeda’s revitalization
involved the developments in neighboring Saudi
Arabia in the late 2000s. By 2007, a number of experienced Saudi terrorists were making their way to Yemen following their defeat in Saudi Arabia, bringing
much better financed terrorists into contact with the
Yemenis.77 The announced merger of the Saudi and
Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda in January 2009, under
the Saudi name of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
was naturally of the greatest concern to the Sanaa government and underscored the danger of strongly revitalized radical forces in Yemen. Yemeni authorities
responded to this new threat as best they could in the
weeks immediately following this declaration, when
the security forces rounded up 170 al-Qaeda suspects
and other potentially dangerous radicals. These individuals were forced to sign pledges that they would
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not engage in terrorism and were then released to the
supervision of their tribal leaders.78 While the pledges
themselves cannot be viewed as a serious deterrent
measure, they were an unmistakable warning to the
suspect individuals that they were under suspicion
and could find themselves facing long terms of imprisonment (if not a death sentence) for future misbehavior. Likewise, the tribal leaders involved in this
situation were required to guarantee the good behavior of these individuals as a condition of their release
into tribal custody. Such actions may therefore have
provided some limited value in preventing various
radicals and malcontents from drifting into jihadist
activities, but are probably of limited effectiveness in
influencing the activities of hard-core terrorists.
Several U.S. and Yemeni estimates of the number
of AQAP members at large were made in the 201011 time frame, and most of them placed that figure
at 200-300.79 By early 2012, the number provided by
Yemeni sources had grown to at least 700, including
members of the insurgent group, Ansar al-Shariah,
which the Yemenis and others consider to be part of
AQAP.80 Even this larger figure has been proven inadequate and needs to be put into a broader context. In
the past, such estimates included only full-time professional terrorists and not supporters or sympathizers who might be brought into the organization at a
later time. Throughout 2011, an increasing number of
AQAP’s supporters and sympathizers seem to have
crossed over to become actively involved in the military struggle against the Yemeni government under
the organizational umbrella of Ansar al-Shariah. Virtually all serious observers will at least acknowledge
that Ansar al-Shariah is affiliated with AQAP, and the
Yemeni government considers it to be a front organi-
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zation for AQAP. This monograph agrees with that
evaluation and will later argue that Ansar al-Shariah
is AQAP-dominated to the degree that it should be
considered an arm of AQAP and not an independent
allied organization.
AQAP insurgents in Yemen could number in the
thousands, and provided the foot soldiers for the
2011-12 insurgency in southern Yemen. Some senior
Yemeni military officers have also referred to Ansar
al-Shariah as a “real army,” which demonstrated courage and tactical skill during the time frame it was most
active.81 The 200-300 number mentioned above might
also be dated, since it is often difficult to track AQAP
growth, which occurs in two ways. The most straightforward way is when additional Yemenis choose to
join AQAP or Ansar al-Shariah for whatever reasons
might be compelling to them. These reasons include
disillusionment and anger with the Yemeni government or with local tribal leaders allied with that government but also because there are financial opportunities for young men who choose to become fighters
for AQAP.82 The second way is for foreign radicals
to leave their own country or previous foreign bases
of operation and join up with al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. This process has often occurred in waves, most
dramatically with Saudi radicals, but there are also
recurring claims that radicals from Pakistan and Afghanistan have moved some of their operations to Yemen in response to problems they are facing in those
countries with local security forces and U.S. drone
attacks.83 Other statements by Yemeni officials claim
that significant numbers of Somali radicals continued
to arrive in Yemen to join with AQAP.84
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AQAP and Ansar al-Shariah.
The Western press has often described the insurgent force, Ansar al-Shariah, as “al-Qaeda linked” or
an “al-Qaeda affiliate.” More assertively, the Yemeni
government has consistently maintained that Ansar
al-Shariah is a branch of AQAP, and Yemeni officials
and media often use the names al-Qaeda and Ansar alShariah interchangeably.85 This Yemeni interpretation
is clearly correct. After an initial period of ambiguity,
AQAP acknowledged that it set up Ansar al-Shariah
and controls this force, and no one from Ansar alShariah has disputed this interpretation. According
to AQAP’s then spiritual guide, Adel al-Abbab, Ansar al-Shariah was established by AQAP to impose
the straightforward message that these fighters were
struggling to establish the laws of God as a substitute
for the corrupt misadministration of the Saleh regime in the territory that they had seized (in practice,
portions of southern Yemen).86 This emphasis on local issues was calculated to convey the image of an
organization focused on fighting the corruption and
brutality of the Saleh government in ways designed to
appeal to at least part of the population. After Ansar
al-Shariah was introduced to the southern Yemenis in
this manner, the links with AQAP were to be allowed
to become more obvious. Moreover, there was some
hope that the message would find resonance, since the
southern populations had little reason to be loyal to
the central government. Rather, many southerners believe that government is not only massively corrupt,
but also dominated by northerners who care very little
about the south. It is also possible that AQAP sought
to construct Ansar al- Shariah as a mass organization
to make certain it was not left behind by the Arab
Spring uprising in Sanaa.
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This use of Ansar al-Shariah as a front organization was also useful since AQAP is often associated
with a larger internationalist agenda, including striking out at Saudi Arabia, the West, and particularly the
United States. Such an agenda, even if it appeals to
some Yemenis, can also appear as a distraction from
local concerns. Al-Qaeda and AQAP leaders have
also worried about the possible tarnishing of the alQaeda name. According to declassified documents
captured in the Abbottabad raid, bin Laden himself
was personally concerned that al-Qaeda’s name and
reputation might have been damaged by the information campaign against it.87 Such damage could clearly
spillover to the regional affiliates who still pledge formal allegiance to the al-Qaeda core, sometimes called
al-Qaeda central (a term bin Laden liked and adopted
after reading it in the Western media). A related reason for the new name may be AQAP’s concern about
jihadist unpopularity in the southern part of the country due to President Saleh’s use of Islamist fighters in
the 1994 civil war. Many of these irregular troops had
been involved in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan,
and many had associated with bin Laden or his lieutenants. Thus, quite apart from international terrorism
concerns, some southerners hold a grudge against bin
Laden, al-Qaeda, and AQAP because of the actions
of these fighters during the civil war. So, while Ansar
al-Shariah appeared on the scene as a jihadist organization, its portrayal as local and spontaneous might
have involved an effort to distinguish the front organization from some inconvenient aspects of previous
jihadi history in Yemen.
Battlefield casualties are another indication of the
overlapping relationship between AQAP and Ansar
al-Shariah. In the aftermath of an airstrike against An-
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sar al-Shariah targets in mid-March 2012, Yemeni officials claimed that an important AQAP leader (Nasser
al-Zafari) had been identified among the dead.88 This
event could be seen as further evidence of the interlinked relationship of Ansar al-Shariah to AQAP.
Additionally, and perhaps more tellingly, significant
numbers of foreign fighters have been reported among
the Ansar al-Shariah dead.89 The bulk of these foreigners are reported as Somalis or Saudis by tribal sources
in the area. Such reports are not surprising. In February 2012, Major General Fred Mugisha of the African
Union forces in Mogadishu stated that Somali radicals, and especially al-Shebab fighters, were fleeing
to Yemen in large numbers because of their increasingly perilous situation in Somalia.90 Egyptians and
Afghans have also been reported to have been found
among the dead.91 It seems unlikely that these foreign
fighters would find their way to Yemen in meaningful numbers and become part of a local group without
international connections. Conversely, it seems much
more certain that they could get to the battle front in
southern Yemen by working through a group with
powerful international connections such as AQAP.
Over time, AQAP’s limited efforts to portray Ansar al-Shariah as a separate organization seem to have
disappeared entirely. While Ansar al-Shariah initially
flew its own flags, by 2012 there were numerous credible reports that al-Qaeda’s black flag is being flown
in areas controlled by Ansar al-Shariah.92 If Ansar alShariah is a different organization from AQAP, they
clearly have no problem flying this flag as though it
was their own. Journalists who have visited these areas state that local people, as well as Ansar al-Shariah
members, use the terms al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Shariah interchangeably. Another indication of the AQAP/
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Ansar al-Shariah relationship occurred following a
major disaster in February 2012 when Ansar al-Shariah defeated Yemeni army forces and captured a number of prisoners. AQAP entered negotiations with a
variety of tribal elders on the possible release of these
captured solders into the custody of their tribes, and
with a promise not to “assist the enemies of Islamic
law.”93 Ansar al-Shariah issued a statement that the
release had been authorized by AQAP Emir Nasser
al-Wuhayshi.94 Their ultimate authority on important
decisions was always the AQAP leadership.
AQAP and the Death of bin Laden.
As noted earlier, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda
have a long history of involvement with Yemen, and
many radical Yemenis have worked with bin Laden
throughout his career. Additionally, a seemingly
warm relationship existed between bin Laden and
AQAP during the terrorist leader’s final years, though
actual command and operational links between alQaeda headquarters and AQAP seem to have faded to
almost nothing by the time of his death in May 2011.
This change took time to develop. Many of the Yemeni founders of al-Qaeda in Yemen (which in 2009
merged with the Saudi branch of al-Qaeda to form
AQAP) fought with al-Qaeda in their youth and were
devoted followers of bin Laden. The current leader of
AQAP, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, worked closely for years
with bin Laden as one of his most trusted and valuable aides in Afghanistan.95 Moreover, Yemen was
chosen as the site of one of al-Qaeda’s most important early anti-American strikes, the bombing of the
USS Cole. Al-Qaeda clearly dominated the attack on
the U.S. warship, although it may have worked with
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a local radical organization (the Aden-Abyan Islamic
Army [AAIA]). Bin Laden personally supervised the
assault, including the choice of target, selection of the
operatives, and funding of expenses.96 He also overruled local suggestions that the best course of action
would be to strike against a commercial ship.
After the 9/11 strikes, changes could be expected.
Bin Laden’s status as the world’s most wanted fugitive would have made it difficult to exert any strong
leadership role over AQAP planning, and he was
consequently relegated to the role of an advisor and
letter writer, who communicated sporadically and
unreliably through couriers. While bin Laden’s advice
to regional affiliates may have been valued at some
levels, he did not have the final word on matters of
any importance. More likely, over time, the AQAP
leadership probably viewed him as an out-of-touch
nuisance, who had to be humored to some degree.
This collapse of bin Laden’s influence with AQAP was
widely suspected prior to his death in Pakistan, but
seems to have been dramatically confirmed by documents seized in the raid on bin Laden’s compound.
Some of these documents have now been declassified
and provided to the Center for Combating Terrorism
at West Point. While this information is incomplete,
it has highlighted a number of interesting trends regarding the difficult and diminishing ties between
bin Laden and AQAP. Among other things, the documents indicate that the al-Qaeda leader was upset
and disappointed that AQAP had chosen to focus the
majority of its effort on fighting the Saleh government
rather than attacking the United States.97 In addition,
bin Laden’s declassified letters indicated that he believed AQAP was making some of the same mistakes
that al-Qaeda forces in Iraq had previously made. He
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was especially concerned that AQAP had attempted
to seize territory without sufficient effort to gain the
confidence of the local people, and that it alienated civilians with the noncombatant deaths it had inflicted.
Also, in a particularly revealing decision, bin Laden
either sent or planned to send one of his most important subordinates (possibly Sheikh Yunis al-Muritani)
to coordinate with both AQAP and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In general, this visit seemed
to be an effort by bin Laden to emphasize his priorities with the local leaders, but it was also something
of a fundraising tour. While there is no record of the
messenger being asked to solicit funds from AQAP,
he was asked to request 200,000 Euros from the usually well-funded AQIM.98 Such a request suggests that
bin Laden was not supporting the regional affiliates
with funding, at least by the time of the request, unless AQIM and AQAP were being treated radically
differently. His likely inability or unwillingness to
provide funds would have denied him an important
instrument, which could otherwise be used to influence AQAP and the other affiliates. Without funds to
provide to AQAP, bin Laden had almost nothing to
offer that organization, and ignoring his advice was
largely without consequences.
Surprisingly, bin Laden held AQAP propagandist
and planner Anwar al Awlaki in low esteem, and was
particularly distressed over the suggestion that Awlaki might at some point become the leader of AQAP.
This concern was apparently not alleviated by Awlaki’s internet advocacy of the importance of striking
at the United States, as well as local Yemeni forces.99
Bin Laden’s reservations about Awlaki may have had
something to do with their lack of personal relationship, or there might have been as yet unclarified dif-
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ferences between them on substantive issues. It is also
possible that bin Laden was somewhat irritated with
the tremendous amount of media coverage that Awlaki received, perhaps fearing that it would eclipse his
own. As noted, bin Laden loved the term “al-Qaeda
central,” and could not be expected to take to the idea
that others had overshadowed him within the world
of radical jihadists. This concern would be especially
clear in the case of Awlaki, who never met bin Laden
and could not be viewed as a bin Laden protégé.
Bin Laden’s death seems to have helped to accelerate the decline of al-Qaeda central and ended whatever residual influence that organization had over offshoot organizations, including AQAP. Unfortunately,
it was not a serious blow to AQAP itself. Bin Laden’s
intermittent advice was almost certainly of little to no
interest to AQAP (since they usually did not follow it),
and his apparent inability to provide funds to AQAP
meant that he had nothing of tangible value to offer to
their cause. After he was killed, he also became a martyr to the al-Qaeda cause and could therefore be held
up as a source of inspiration to AQAP members and
potential recruits. Additionally, in a highly symbolic
but probably operationally meaningless gesture, the
AQAP leadership, as noted, has sworn loyalty to bin
Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Emergence of an AQAP-Led Insurgency
in Southern Yemen.
AQAP functioned primarily as a terrorist organization prior to 2010, but it later expanded its operations
to include efforts to capture, hold, and rule territory in
areas where the Yemeni government had only a limited ability to maintain security. This new strategy of
seizing and retaining territory was implemented prior
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to the uprising in Tunisia and the onset of the Arab
Spring, although it was later accelerated due to the
Arab Spring-inspired turmoil in Yemen. One of the
earliest indications of AQAP’s increased willingness
to fight as an insurgent force can be seen during the
August 2010 combat operations in the southern town
of Loder, which is around 150 kilometers (95 miles)
northeast of Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan
province. Once the insurgents captured territory, the
population was almost always subjected to heavy political indoctrination, based on the favored AQAP/
Ansar al-Shariah question, “Why do you oppose being ruled by the law of God?”
Unfortunately for AQAP, no propaganda effort was likely to make their rule palatable to many
independent-minded Yemeni tribesmen. The form
of Shariah law imposed by this group stressed harsh
“Islamic punishments” for any transgression that the
group perceives to have occurred. One Ansar al-Shariah leader is reported to have stated that their objective was, “to apply God’s laws in Abyan, the Taliban
way.”100 This goal was apparently fully met in Yemeni
territory controlled by AQAP/Ansar al-Shariah. According to a variety of sources, including Amnesty International, Ansar al-Shariah implemented an array of
extremely harsh punishments for any action that was
viewed as an infraction of their version of Islamic law.
Such punishments included crucifixions, public beheadings, amputations, and floggings.101 One woman
was even executed for “sorcery.”102 Moreover, while it
is possible that government-friendly media in Yemen
exaggerated the brutality of Ansar al-Shariah, stories
told by refugees from these towns overlap a great deal,
and many Western and regional reporters have talked
to anonymous refugees who have no reason to lie on
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behalf of the government. Indeed, many, if not most,
southerners are critical of the government.103
In one of their earliest insurgent successes, AQAP/
Ansar al-Shariah established a strong presence in
Loder, which the Yemeni army chose to contest in August 2010.104 As part of their new strategy, AQAP forces initially remained in Loder to fight against Yemeni
military forces rather than attempting to escape with
departing civilians. These actions indicated a level of
commitment to their cause, as well as perhaps some
degree of contempt for the quality of Yemeni military
forces. Government forces ultimately won the battle in
Loder and regained control of the town after several
days of fighting, when at least some AQAP members
escaped.105 Heavy casualties were not reported on either side, perhaps indicating that AQAP did not view
Loder as important enough to initiate a bloody last
stand of the fighters involved.106 Such a departure was
probably reasonable, since the Yemeni government
would always have the option of using artillery, airpower, and perhaps tanks to retake the town. After
the battle, the citizens of Loder clearly did not want
AQAP back, and formed armed resistance committees
in 2011 to prevent AQAP from again seizing the town.
The catalyst for the formation of the committees was
the capture of the nearby city of Zinjibar by the militants in that time frame, and the concern that AQAP
was once again expanding its territorial holdings.107
These committees effectively defended Loder on a
number of future occasions, when AQAP attempted
to recapture the city but failed to do so.108 After tasting Ansar al-Shariah rule, the citizens of Loder were
clearly willing to fight ferociously to prevent a new
AQAP takeover of their small city.
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Elsewhere, in September 2010, Yemeni army units
were again engaged in urban combat against al-Qaeda
forces.109 This time the fight flared up in the town of
Hawta, which has a population of around 20,000. At
least 8,000 of these people (and possibly a great deal
more) were able to flee the village during the fighting.110 Many others were prevented from escaping by
the insurgents, so that their presence could help shield
the terrorists from artillery and airstrikes while complicating the tactical operations of the Yemeni ground
forces.111 Such actions may have been precisely the
type of behavior that bin Laden and other international jihadist leaders had warned AQAP to avoid if
it wanted to gain the loyalty of the population. This
encounter was also reported to have involved Yemeni
army tanks and armored vehicles moving against an
uncertain number of AQAP members.
In the 2010 fighting, AQAP showed its evolution
as an insurgent organization through the ability to
ambush or attack squad, platoon, and perhaps larger
units of the Yemeni army. Police units were also regularly attacked.112 In one September 2010 incident in
the provincial capital of Zinjibar, al-Qaeda attackers
on motorbikes used hit-and-run tactics against two
separate police targets, indicating careful planning
and effective execution of a synchronized mission. In
September 2010, AQAP also issued a “death list” that
included the names of 55 military, judicial, and police
officials targeted for assassination.113 Such lists are a
common feature of insurgencies, and they serve as
a warning that the named officials must resign their
posts or face the possibility of being murdered. Adding to the uncertainty has been al-Qaeda’s history of
killing or kidnapping a number of very senior security
officials throughout the country, suggesting that anyone they target may be vulnerable.114
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In the aftermath of AQAP’s withdrawal from
Loder, there remained some positive signs regarding
Yemen’s efforts to control terrorism. In the summer
of 2010, some of Yemen’s tribal leaders in the areas
south and east of Sanaa seemed to be reevaluating
their views on the costs and benefits of sheltering alQaeda suspects in their areas. The harboring of such
fugitives led to Yemeni military raids into their territory, and threatened to disrupt any patronage networks providing funds from Sanaa or Riyadh. Thus,
both a key source of tribal income and overall security
within tribal areas were threatened. In response to this
evolving situation, tribal leaders from the important
Abida and al-Ashraf tribes pledged that they would
“stop harboring people wanted by the security forces
or who are accused of belonging to al-Qaeda.”115 These
pledges were interesting and positive developments,
but not particularly surprising, since virtually no
tribal leaders wish to see a new source of authority in
their regions that might displace them. While certain
tribal leaders have often been willing to shelter AQAP
members for money, they have never been interested
in ceding their authority to this group. Yet, seizing
such authority from tribal leaders was now clearly
understood to be an AQAP goal.116
The progress that AQAP made in its ability to deploy its insurgent forces dramatically escalated following the split within the army over civilian deaths
in the March 2011 massacre of peaceful demonstrators
in Sanaa and other cities. Ansar al-Shariah captured
the southern city of Jaar in March and Zinjibar in May
2011, displacing thousands of residents.117 This battle
involved one of the earliest known insurgent uses of
the name, Ansar al-Shariah. On this occasion, the insurgents flew white banners with the words, “Ansar
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al-Shariah,” written on them and did not fly al-Qaeda
flags as they were to do later.118 Around 1,000 militants
were reported to have seized Zinjibar after coming
from Jaar, which had previously fallen to AQAP forces. The Yemeni army’s 25th Mechanized Brigade was
reported to have resisted the Islamists but was unable
to prevent the city from being captured.119 The 25th
Brigade remained stationed near Zinjibar, but mostly
conducted defensive operations in the aftermath of
the defeat.120 The insurgents came close to overrunning this unit in July 2011, but government forces
managed to fend off the attacks with the support of
air force units that were identified publicly as Yemeni,
but were widely suspected of including U.S. drones or
cruise missiles.121 Yemen’s Deputy Information Minister stated that the United States has provided unspecified “logistical support” for the 25th Brigade in order
for it to cope with the insurgent siege.122
Offensive operations by the 25th Brigade in 2011
consisted mostly of shelling the insurgents with artillery. There were also at least three efforts to use tribal
mediators to get the insurgents to withdraw from the
city without further violence.123 The government’s
heavy use of artillery and air power may have led to
a significant level of civilian collateral damage at various points in the campaign.124 While it would seem
easy to criticize the brigade’s leadership for lacking
an offensive spirit, it should be understood that they
were coping with serious problems in supplying their
troops, due to the chaos permeating the Yemeni governmental system at this time. Logistical efforts from
Sanaa could not occur due to the unrest, and Ansar
al-Shariah cut off the supply route from the nearby
southern city of Aden to complete the brigade’s isolation. Under these circumstances, 25th Brigade leaders
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may have feared initiating offensive actions that they
could not finish. Ansar al-Shariah, therefore, remained
in control of Zinjibar, Jaar, and other areas in the rural south without serious offensive actions leveled
against them on the ground throughout the remainder
of Saleh’s presidency. The military actions that did occur, for the most part, came from the air.
As President Hadi took office, he faced a strong
and energized insurgency that had flourished after
the year-long power struggle in Sanaa. When asked
about his unit’s situation in January, a Yemeni army
lieutenant stationed in the south stated, “We are like
an island in a sea of al-Qaeda. We are surrounded in
every direction.”125 Under these circumstances, the
Yemeni press worried that AQAP would make even
more progress in capturing territory in the south.126
These concerns were reasonable. In mid-January 2012,
around 200 militants seized control of Rida, a town
of around 60,000 people, about 100 miles south of Sanaa.127 They remained in control of the town for only
about 10 days. During that time, relatively few people
seem to have been killed although about 10 police
officers were reported to have been abducted, and
around 100 prisoners were released from the Rida central prison, including members of AQAP.128 It appears
possible that local authorities struck a deal whereby
AQAP could enter the town, release its prisoners, and
then leave. It is also possible that the AQAP forces understood that they did not have a large enough force
in the town to retain control if the townspeople were
roused against them.
By February 2012, both sides were expecting the
conflict to escalate. President Hadi had taken a clear
hard line against AQAP as he entered the office of the
presidency, and they had responded with considerable
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ferocity by striking Yemeni government targets with
suicide bombings and other acts of terrorism. These
strikes were made in order to create government failures before Hadi could consolidate his authority. In
his inauguration speech, Hadi called for “the continuation of the war against al-Qaeda as a religious and
national duty.”129 The challenge President Hadi faced
from AQAP was violently asserted just hours after
he took office on February 26, when a double suicide
car bombing led to the deaths of 26 people outside a
Republican Guard compound in the southern city of
Mukalla.130 At least 20 of the dead were soldiers.131
Moreover, by the time Hadi assumed office, the
situation in the south was extremely precarious. Ansar al-Shariah forces had previously taken control of
Zinjibar in September 2011, although they had failed
to seize the military facilities outside of the city which
remained under the control of the 25th Mechanized
Brigade. The commander of that unit told a pan-Arab
newspaper by telephone that Yemeni army forces attempting to resupply them had been ambushed and
defeated, but the troops were able to hang on because
the United States had sent some of its aircraft to airdrop
food and supplies.132 Later, AQAP spokesman Fahd
al-Qusa claimed that the Yemeni military was only
able to continue operations because of the support it
received from U.S. air assets, including drones.133 Qusa
then admitted that the government had been able to
open a road to supply the 25th Mechanized Brigade,
and this resupply effort allowed it to avoid collapse.
Qusa had sometimes been identified as AQAP’s third
in command. Somewhat ironically, the press would
later report that he had been killed by a U.S. drone.134
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The 2012 Government Offensive in Abyan
Province and Beyond.
As he prepared to assume the presidency, Abed
Rabbu Hadi promised to intensify the war against
AQAP and destroy that organization’s power within
Yemen. This was an ambitious agenda, since the 2011
split in the Yemeni security forces between pro-Saleh
and anti-Saleh forces created a security vacuum which
AQAP was able to exploit to capture territory in the
south. Now, a new government appeared interested
in moving forward, although problems remained due
to the continuing divisions within the armed forces.
Many of these loyalists expected Hadi to allow them
to stay in their positions, while their critics demanded
that they be removed. Hadi initially retained a number
of Saleh loyalists in office, although he was at least able
to remove some of the military leaders he regarded as
most untrustworthy or corrupt. Still, he could not wait
to restructure the military or heal its divisions before
moving forward in the war against AQAP.
Unfortunately, Hadi’s war against AQAP did not
start out well. On February 18, 2012, about 1 week before Hadi was inaugurated, but well after Saleh had
relinquished actual presidential power to Hadi, Yemen’s army suffered a staggering defeat at the hands of
Ansar al-Shariah. At least 185 troops were killed when
Ansar al-Shariah forces attacked a southern military
encampment at dawn and killed a number of soldiers,
many while they slept.135 There also were around 70
Yemeni soldiers captured in the fighting, including
approximately seven officers.136 Ansar al-Shariah further captured a significant amount of equipment from
Yemeni forces, including artillery pieces and armored
vehicles. In the aftermath of the battle, Ansar al-Sha-
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riah forces paraded some of this equipment through
the streets of Jaar as a celebration of the victory.137
Photographs of Ansar al-Shariah fighters posing with
these weapons were posted on jihadist websites and
subsequently republished by the Yemeni and other
Arab media.138
Some Yemeni citizens, furious about the defeat,
charged that the disaster occurred because of the actions of incompetent or collaborationist army officers
who had failed to take the proper precautions. Various critics also maintained that local commanders
had struck long-term agreements with local insurgent
leaders which served as informal cease-fires.139 While
insurgent forces may have honored these agreements
for a while, they seem to have been used to lull the
local army units into a state of complacency. Such actions would have created the conditions for AQAP to
set a deadly trap. Moreover, while army losses were
heavy, only 32 Ansar al-Shariah fighters were killed
in the battle. Some prisoners also appear to have been
released in what may have been an effort to accommodate various Yemeni tribes after mediation by religious scholars and tribal elders.140 Also, and perhaps
more importantly, lenient treatment of prisoners may
have been used to give Yemeni forces an important
incentive to surrender in future battles. If AQAP ordered all of their captives killed or savagely mistreated them, more Yemeni government troops might well
fight to the death in all future combat.
Unsurprisingly, the AQAP leadership showed
no interest in relaxing their struggle following their
victory against the Yemeni army in the south. Less
than 2 hours after Hadi was inaugurated, a suicide
bomber rammed a Toyota truck into the wall of a
presidential residence protected by Republican Guard
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troops in the southern city of Mukalla.141 Twenty-six
people within the compound were killed, including a number of guardsmen. AQAP insurgents also
began striking against army garrisons in the south
with hit-and-run raids. Yemeni officials admitted that
the insurgents had seized armored vehicles, artillery
pieces, and small arms during some of these attacks,
in addition to the equipment captured following the
February 18 battle.142
After the February defeats, the Yemeni military
began to improve its performance in partial response
to these hard lessons. Around 200 of Yemen’s antiterrorist Special Forces were deployed into the contested areas to help local forces that were resisting
Ansar al-Shariah.143 According to the Yemen Post, these
counterterrorism forces were sent to bolster government forces in Loder, which remained a key target for
Ansar al-Shariah forces.144 As discussed earlier, local
tribal resistance committees were heavily involved in
the defense of Loder, and participated in a great deal
of the heaviest fighting in coordination with army
units. Tribal officials claimed that the Yemeni army
provided them with weapons, and it is possible that
tribal forces from outside the city also received money
to participate in the fighting.145 Additionally, artillery
and units of Yemen’s air force were used against the
insurgents, while many journalists expressed their
strong belief that U.S. drones had also been deployed
in strikes against insurgent forces.146 Under these conditions, Loder was effectively defended, and insurgents were unable to capture it a second time.
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Other problems followed for the insurgents. On
May 6, 2012, senior AQAP leader Fahd al-Qusa was
killed in what the Yemeni government referred to as
an air strike, although the world press usually identified the incident as a missile strike by a U.S. drone.147
Al-Qusa was a former associate of bin Laden who was
wanted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation for
his involvement in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.
He made serious mistakes in the attack on the USS
Cole, although he may have gained some skill and
sophistication as a terrorist leader over time.148 He
was also one of the few AQAP members involved in
the 2006 prison break who was still alive and active
in terrorism by early 2012. The death of such a wellknown AQAP leader on the verge of an important offensive may have provided a potential advantage to
the Yemeni government by eliminating a well-placed
field commander. Seeking vengeance, AQAP quickly
responded to Qusa’s death by attacking a Yemeni
military base near Zinjibar, with inconclusive results.
Journalistic sources maintain that extensive use of
drones just prior to Hadi’s planned May offensive
helped to gather useful intelligence, and disrupted
the AQAP command and control by eliminating high
value targets. Qusa, despite the mistakes in his early
career, may have been considered a high value target.
On May 12, 2012, following the earlier effort to prepare the battlefield, Yemeni military forces launched
Hadi’s much anticipated offensive to recapture AQAP
controlled areas in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces.
The Yemeni offensive was conducted with a force of
around 20,000 regular army soldiers, supported by significant numbers of paid local tribal auxiliaries.149 U.S.
military advisors were reported to have helped the
Yemeni forces with planning the offensive, and Saudi
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Arabia provided considerable financial assistance to
support the operation.150 It appears that a large share
of the Saudi funds may have been used to hire tribal
militia auxiliaries to support the army. These types of
fighters have often been highly effective in this kind
of combat in Yemen.151 A number of tribes have a long
history of accepting money from Saudi Arabia, and
would have no problem accepting government funds
to fight against AQAP.152
Just as importantly, Yemen’s air force appeared to
have been deployed with much greater intensity.153
However, there is some doubt as to how much of
the air effort was actually carried on by the Yemeni
air force, and how much came from outside sources.
Journalist sources noted what they called, “the government’s routine insistence that only its aircraft carry
out such operations on Yemeni soil,” but they did not
take such denials seriously. 154 Rather, virtually the entire Yemeni and international press corps seemed to
assume that the increasingly effective air support was
mostly provided by U.S. drone aircraft and missiles
launched from U.S. warships.155 Journalists from both
the United States and Yemen claim to have spoken
to a wide range of U.S. and Yemeni officials and also
point to the extensive use of airpower in the campaign
against AQAP. Observers often stress that Yemen’s
air force has only limited capabilities under the most
optimal conditions, and operational readiness at the
time (including recovering from a recent air force mutiny and work strike) were hardly optimal.156 Other
observers also suggest that the U.S. drone campaign
was too large and significant to be kept a secret.
As the southern offensive continued, AQAP again
struck back quickly and painfully against the government with a May 12, 2012, suicide attack against
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a military parade rehearsal at Sabeen Square in Sanaa, in which around 96 people were killed and 300
wounded.157 The Yemeni defense minister, who was
scheduled to visit the rehearsal, was late, and therefore spared the possibility of being killed in the bombing. The attacker was a suicide bomber dressed in a
Central Security Force (CSF) uniform who managed
to work his way into the ranks of the soldiers getting
ready for the rehearsal.158 AQAP claimed that action
was, “only the beginning of jihad.”159
Fortunately, the horrific attack in Sabeen Square
did nothing to slow the southern offensive. Yemeni
ground forces repeatedly attacked targets in or near
Zinjibar throughout the first month of the fighting.
The push against the provincial capital was described
by Yemeni officials as a “wide offensive” that involved
military pressure being directed against the city from
three sides, using elements of the army, air force, and
tribal militias. Elements of the Yemeni navy were involved in the offensive, and may have played a useful supporting role since Zinjibar is a coastal city.160
Yemeni government forces also recaptured Jaar at
almost the same time that they liberated Zinjibar, following a night evacuation of Ansar al-Shariah fighters from that city.161 Government forces reported that
they had captured an AQAP ammunition factory in
Jaar, and killed more than 50 insurgent fighters in the
area.162 On June 12, Major General Salem Qatan, commander of the 31st Armored Brigade, announced that,
“[t]he cities of Zinjibar and Jaar have been completely
cleansed.”163 He made this announcement from the
local government headquarters in Zinjibar. On June
14, Yemeni Defense Minister Mohammed Nasser
Ahmed toured Zinjibar to demonstrate his safety in
doing so and thereby underscore the government’s
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control of the city.164 Sadly, 6 days after he had made
his announcement on liberating Zinjibar, General
Qatan was killed by a suicide bomber in Aden, after the
attacker ran up to his car behaving as a beggar
seeking charity.165
Yemeni government determination continued to
produce results after the liberation of Zinjibar, which
was widely viewed as a turning point in the struggle.
In mid-June 2012, Yemeni army and militia forces captured the port town of Shaqra, the last major Ansar
al-Shariah stronghold in Abyan province.166 As the
offensive pushed forward in late June 2012, Yemeni
forces captured Azzan in Shabwa province, the last
town held by Ansar al-Shariah in the southern and
eastern provinces.167 Yemeni Defense Ministry officials
claimed to have captured a large cache of bombs and
explosives in Azzan.168 Many Yemenis were deeply
surprised that the government had been able to retake
captured territory so rapidly. Yemeni Brigadier General Mohammed al-Sawmali stated, “This is the end
of al-Qaeda’s aspirations to establish an Islamic rule
in the south. There is no comeback to this.”169 General al-Sawmali also stated that he expected AQAP
to continue to wage war against the government,
with “selective operations targeting key political and
military figures.”170 This prediction was later proven
to be accurate. Also, in a last act of brutality before
leaving civilian areas they had occupied, retreating
Ansar al-Shariah forces planted mines throughout
the area they were evacuating. On June 27, the Saudi
press cited Yemeni officials as stating that 73 civilians
had been killed by mines emplaced by the retreating
insurgents.171 Three days later, that number rose to
81, although Yemeni military officials also claimed
their forces had removed 3,000 landmines from the
afflicted areas.172
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While a significant number of insurgents were
killed in these battles, it was uncertain how many
fighters had escaped to continue their armed struggle
at a later time under more favorable circumstances. In
Shabwa province, some tribal leaders were reported to
be making an effort to persuade some of the defeated
Islamist fighters to surrender and renounce their past
affiliation with the militants. In Yemen, such leaders
will sometimes guarantee the future good behavior
of their tribal members in exchange for some sort of
amnesty.173 Unfortunately, these efforts do not seem
to have produced significant results. AQAP may have
been driven from the urban areas it had previously
captured, but many of its members remained committed to the struggle.
In the aftermath of these defeats and the loss of territory, AQAP leaders continued to believe that they
needed to assert the power and relevance of their organization and underscore their willingness to continue the struggle. Unsurprisingly, they fell back upon
terrorism including a ferocious campaign of urban
bombings and assassinations. On June 18, an AQAP
suicide bomber killed Major General Salem Qatan in
circumstances described earlier.174 Another important assassination occurred on July 19, when Colonel
Abdullah al-Maouzaei triggered a booby trap in his
car in southern Yemen.175 A less successful assassination attempt occurred in late July when an improvised
explosive device (IED) attack wounded Air Force
Colonel Yahia al-Rusaishan, but failed to kill him.176
Al-Rusaishan had played an important role in hunting
down AQAP members and survived three previous
assassination attempts. The government responded to these attacks with intense investigations and
claimed to have broken up a number of terrorist cells
as a result.177
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More spectacularly, in mid-July, an AQAP suicide
bomber exploded himself outside of a police academy in Sanaa just as the police cadets were leaving
the grounds. Twenty-two people, most of whom were
cadets, were killed in the attack.178 Security forces later
arrested an individual whom they claimed helped
plan the earlier suicide attack of the parade rehearsal
and may well have been involved with the police academy bombing.179 Outside of Sanaa, AQAP again undertook a major operation in which a suicide bomber
killed 45 members of the Popular Defense Committee
in Jaar. The leader of this unit, Abdul Latif al-Sayed,
was among the dead, and dozens of other tribal fighters were wounded in the strike.180 Another especially
bold attack occurred in mid-August when AQAP terrorists killed 14 Yemeni soldiers in a grenade and car
bomb attack on the intelligence service headquarters
in Aden.181
Since that time, AQAP has remained active, and
many other government security officials have been
killed in bombings and drive-by shootings from cars
or especially motorcycles.182 AQAP leaders have stated that their operatives use motorcycles because they
believe that they are less likely to be targeted by U.S.
drones.183 Intelligence and security officers were often
favorite targets for assassination efforts, and officers
of high rank known to be loyal to President Hadi
were especially favored targets.184 Leaders of political
parties and government ministers were also frequent
targets.185 In this environment, Yemeni security forces have struck back hard and claim to have broken
a number of AQAP terrorist plots before they were
implemented.186 According to government announcements, the security forces have arrested a number of
aspiring suicide bombers who were planning attacks
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on government buildings, foreign embassies, military
commanders, and other “important people.”187 In addition to their standard security activities, Yemeni officials initiated a strong crackdown against unlicensed
motorcycles, especially in the south. While many of
these measures may have been useful, AQAP remains
a tough adversary capable of significant acts of domestic and international terrorism. They also remain
interested in future political crises or breakdowns in
Yemeni government authority that they may be able
to exploit.
AQAP TERRORISM EFFORTS DIRECTED
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
During the 2009-12 time frame, AQAP continued
to seek ways to strike against the United States, despite its focus on implementing the southern insurgency and waging the subsequent major battles in
that region. AQAP leaders considered terrorist strikes
against the United States and waging war against
the Saleh government as overlapping priorities, despite the potential for a dissipation of resources with
an overly ambitious agenda. There were some potentially high payoffs for such strategies despite the
danger of overreach. A successful strike against the
United States could vastly enhance AQAP’s prestige
as the cutting edge of jihadi terror, and thereby help
to improve their recruiting and fundraising efforts.
Moreover, AQAP leaders did not seem to fear a possible U.S. intervention with ground forces into Yemen
in the aftermath of such a strike and may even have
welcomed it. Had the United States invaded Yemen
in response to a spectacular terror strike, it is almost
certain that large elements of the population would
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have been willing to fight any foreign invader no matter how valid the reason for intervention might have
been. In such circumstances, the U.S. leadership would
have an overwhelming need to strike back hard and
might easily choose the wrong way of doing so.
One of the first and most ambitious AQAP operations against the United States took place on December
25, 2009, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian operative trained by AQAP in Yemen, attempted
to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines passenger jet that left Amsterdam, The Netherlands, with
280 people aboard. The failed terrorist was badly
burned when a bomb sewn into his underwear did
not detonate properly, and he was then handcuffed
and restrained by airline personnel, so that he could
be arrested when the aircraft landed. At his trial in
the United States, Abdulmutallab pleaded guilty to
eight charges related to the attack and called the bomb
a “blessed weapon.”188 Abdulmutallab was found
guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. He also
stated that he had met radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki
and been inspired by him to oppose the United States
with violence.189
President Obama responded to the unsuccessful
bombing attempt by announcing plans to expand efforts to help the Yemeni government implement an
effective counterterrorism program. The President
further maintained that he had “no intention of sending U.S. boots on the ground” to Yemen as a result of
this incident, noting that, “in countries like Yemen, in
countries like Somalia, I think working with international partners is most effective at this point.”190 President Obama’s statement echoed earlier remarks by
U.S. military leaders including Admiral Mike Mullen,
then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who as-
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serted that sending U.S. combat troops to Yemen was
“not a possibility.”191 In response to both the attempted terrorist strike and U.S. outrage, Yemen quickly
announced that it had arrested 29 people believed to
be members of AQAP in a domestic crackdown on
that organization.
AQAP’s next major operation against the United
States involved parcel bombs sent by cargo aircraft
from Yemen in October 2010, with the delivery firms
United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express.
AQAP bombmakers had filled toner cartridges with
explosive material and then had the explosives-laden
parcels sent to the United States. According to journalistic sources, the attack failed when the packages
were intercepted in London, UK, and Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, as a result of information provided by
Saudi intelligence.192 The plan was apparently to have
the packages detonate while the cargo aircraft were in
flight and cause them to crash over the ocean. If this
effort failed, the packages were addressed to be delivered to synagogues in the Chicago area where they
would kill whoever opened them.
AQAP leaders have also been associated with efforts to incite Muslims in the West to strike against
Western targets through the use of web-based technology.193 In the past, internet jihadists have often been
a limited threat. Many of these people enjoy placing
blood curdling postings in internet chat rooms but
balk at making any sort of serious sacrifice for radical
causes. A few are more willing to play a serious role
in jihad if they are properly recruited. AQAP has been
willing to commit time and resources to overcome the
problem of discerning potential recruits from bored
hobbyists and recruited some deeply committed individuals to engage in acts of terrorism. Cell phone
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videos of al-Qaeda units fighting in Iraq have been
reported to be an important tool for al-Qaeda recruitment efforts in Yemen.194 The effort to identify and develop jihadists from the vast pool of internet radicals
is difficult and time-consuming. Some problems of
ineptitude can surface when using terrorists recruited
over the Internet. Additionally, a variety of political
changes in the Middle East may have influenced the
climate and complicated efforts to recruit terrorists
over the Internet. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and
the projected withdrawal from Afghanistan, seems to
have reduced levels of anger in the Muslim world that
AQAP recruiters have previously been able to exploit.
One AQAP leader who was widely suspected of
inciting radicals and recruiting terrorists over the
Internet is the now-deceased cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki.195 U.S. Federal prosecutors in the first underwear
bomber case believe Awlaki was directly involved in
planning this attack.196 He is also widely believed to
have inspired and helped to radicalize a U.S. Army
psychiatrist, who at this time is being prosecuted for
an August 2009 shooting attack at Fort Hood, TX,
where 13 people were killed and 32 wounded.197 The
psychiatrist is expected to plead innocent to the charges, although the basis for his defense is not yet clear.
According to Newsweek, President Obama saw Awlaki
as an exceptional danger, and told his advisors that
Awlaki was an even higher priority for elimination or
capture than Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda following bin Laden’s death.198 This decision was
not arbitrary. If Awlaki was the mastermind behind
the first underwear bomber as federal prosecutors allege, his plan came quite close to killing 280 people,
and perhaps even creating a situation where the U.S.
leadership would be seriously pressured by domes-
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tic public opinion to invade Yemen. Such an invasion
would produce an inflamed backlash among Yemen’s
tribes, who might then swell the ranks of AQAP.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine
such a war leading to a good outcome for the United States. U.S. forces could defeat Yemeni tribesmen
on a consistent basis, but it is hard to see how they
could transform Yemeni society in ways that would
leave that country an ally following an eventual U.S.
military withdrawal.
The U.S. emphasis on finding Awlaki produced results. The AQAP radical was killed on September 30,
2011, in the Yemeni town of Khashef by what the press
describes as a Predator drone operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency.199 In his announcement on Awlaki’s death, President Obama called his elimination
a “major blow” in the struggle against al-Qaeda but
gave almost no details about U.S. involvement in the
operation. The U.S. Government has never acknowledged that a drone strike took place in this instance,
and the Yemeni government also attempted to take
credit for Awlaki’s death in announcements to its own
public.200 In making this choice, President Obama was
clearly aware of the inflammatory potential of a U.S.
leader claiming to target and kill a terrorist suspect
with a drone in Yemen in contrast to the Yemeni government’s wishes. He therefore chose not to reveal
any details that might embarrass that government.
The death of Anwar al-Awlaki has sometimes been
identified as reducing the chances of further AQAP
attacks against the United States, since websites associated with him advocated such strikes.201 Unfortunately, this conclusion is an oversimplification which
U.S. leaders need to avoid. AQAP clearly focused on
Yemeni issues in 2011-12 due to the collapse of the
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Saleh regime and the political turmoil surrounding
this event, but international terrorism remained an
important component of the organization’s agenda.
They have also indicated that victory in Yemen is considered a first step to a new campaign to overthrow
the royal family in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, any
doubts about AQAP’s plans to continue efforts to attack Western targets were quickly set aside as a new
AQAP plot against the United States was uncovered.
This 2012 plot centered on an effort to once again
attack a U.S. airliner, this time with a modified and improved underwear bomb. According to the Wall Street
Journal, the planned operation was efficiently uncovered as the result of the actions of a Saudi agent who
had previously infiltrated AQAP and “volunteered”
for a suicide mission in the knowledge that he would
later be able to expose operational terrorist plans to
the Saudi government.202 The agent’s superiors within
AQAP accepted his offer and provided him with explosives, which were then turned over to Saudi intelligence. Information surrounding this incident was
then shared with the United States. The plot did not
appear to have moved forward, since the device was
not seized at an airport and the mission had apparently not been assigned to a specific flight, according
to the Washington Post.203 U.S. officials have described
the bomb used in this incident as an upgraded version of the 2009 device, but declined to give further
details.204 Yemeni officials and intelligence organizations appeared to have no knowledge of the plot.205
One particularly dangerous AQAP member who
was reported to be involved with the ongoing efforts
against the United States is Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri.
Asiri is a Saudi Arabian radical and bombmaker,
who appears totally committed to opposing the Saudi
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monarchy and its allies. He has been credited with
constructing both the first underwear bomb and the
devices within the printer cartridges that were to be
used for the parcel bombs.206 He is also likely to have
been responsible for the upgraded underwear bomb.
Underscoring his commitment to AQAP, Asiri sent his
own brother on an August 2009 mission to serve as a
human bomb assigned to assassinate then Saudi Deputy Interior Minister and Chief of Counterterrorism,
Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Prince Mohammed led
Saudi Arabia’s campaign against domestic al-Qaeda
supporters from 2003-12, and he was therefore an extremely important AQAP target both for operational
reasons and for revenge. Asiri’s brother had contacted
the Prince with an offer to surrender and bring his
supporters with him into the Saudi rehabilitation program. This plot failed when the energy of the human
bomb was directed in unexpected ways and killed
only the terrorist attacker. Prince Mohammad was
only slightly hurt, although he undoubtedly emerged
from the incident with a newfound caution regarding
the enemy he was fighting. Prince Mohammad’s effectiveness and his contribution to the struggle against
AQAP were later recognized when he was appointed
Saudi Arabian interior minister in November 2012.207
AQAP has also attacked U.S. and Western targets
within Yemen, including the U.S. embassy, which
was fired upon by mortar shells in March 2008. In
this instance, the shells fell short of the embassy but
killed a guard and injured 13 students at a nearby
girl’s school.208 Two al-Qaeda members were later apprehended and sentenced to death for this action.209
A larger and much better planned attack occurred on
September 16, 2008, when six AQAP operatives disguised as police officers attacked the embassy with
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car bombs, killing 16 people including one American.
Another serious attack against the Western diplomatic
presence in Yemen occurred in April 2010 when an
al-Qaeda suicide bomber attempted to kill the British
ambassador by targeting his car convoy in Sanaa. The
ambassador was unhurt, although three bystanders
were wounded and the bomber killed.210 The attempted assassination of a well-protected British diplomat
was an embarrassment for the Yemeni government
but not a crisis since no UK nationals were seriously
injured or killed. More recently, in December 2012,
three kilograms of gold (approximately U.S.$160,000)
was offered for killing U.S. ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein.211 They also offered 5 million Yemeni
riyals (U.S.$23,000) for the killing of any U.S. Soldier
in Yemen.212
THE ISSUE OF DRONES
In addition to U.S. military assistance to Yemen,
there is also a program to help the Yemenis with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), often simply known
as drones. The U.S. and world press often maintain
that the Yemeni government victories in the 2012 offensive were greatly abetted, if not enabled, by the
U.S. drone program put into place to support Yemeni
ground forces. This is a difficult claim to assess, due to
the lack of publically available details about the use of
drones. Until recently, the U.S. leadership has been reluctant to admit any use of such systems in Yemen out
of deference to sensitivities particularly apparent under President Saleh’s leadership. Over time, however,
this policy was relaxed due to the extensive U.S. and
global media coverage of drone use, and the implausibility of further denials. In late April 2012, White
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House Counterterrorism Adviser John O. Brennan
stated publicly that the United States was using drone
aircraft to strike against terrorism suspects and to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States, although he
did not explicitly mention Yemen as a venue for such
activities.213 On October 11, 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta went further, noting that such systems have played a “vital role” in government victories
over AQAP in Yemen, but did not elaborate further.214
In a particularly forthcoming statement, Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told a reporter on the
sidelines of a June 2012 counter-piracy conference in
Dubai that, “drones were used upon Yemen’s request
against fleeing al Qaeda leaders” during the 2012 offensive.215 Foreign Minister Qirbi’s statement came in
a context of the greater American openness about the
use of these systems.
All remaining Yemeni government secrecy or deniability about drone use ended in September 2012
when President Hadi commented directly and extensively on the use of such systems. Hadi stated that he
had allowed U.S. use of drones in Yemen to strike at
terrorist targets. In doing so, he seems to have decided
that there was no point in continuing Saleh’s policy of
denying drone strikes in Yemen since the strikes were
routinely covered in the press, and virtually no one
believed the government. Consequently, on a visit to
the United States, Hadi informed the Washington Post
that Yemen did allow U.S. drone strikes, but it also
carefully regulated such activities.216 According to
the Yemeni president, U.S. drone attacks on Yemeni
targets are not allowed unless he first approves them.
Hadi has therefore taken responsibility for the strikes,
while asserting that he does not allow the interests of
the United States to supersede Yemeni interests. If a
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drone strike is not in the interests of Yemen, he refuses
to authorize it. Moreover, Hadi also maintains that using drones helps ensure that only proper targets are
hit and collateral damage is minimized. According to
Hadi, “[t]he drone technologically is more advanced
than the human brain,” suggesting that these systems
are more accurate than manned combat aircraft. 217 He
also stated that Yemen’s air force could not bomb accurately at night, but the U.S. drones did not have any
problems in doing so. Hadi thereby asserted that the
drones were a better system for avoiding mistakes and
collateral damage. Also, in another very candid admission, Hadi acknowledged that some drone strikes
have accidentally killed innocent people, but he also
claimed that Yemen and the United States have taken
“multiple measures to avoid mistakes of the past.”218
Hadi’s decision to acknowledge the U.S. use of
drones in the struggle against AQAP drew a mixed
response in Yemen. Some Yemenis appeared to appreciate that he was more open than Saleh and saw his
honesty as a break from the past.219 While drone strikes
remain highly controversial in Yemen, the Yemeni
public also seems to have become somewhat more tolerant of U.S. drone use over the last year than it was
over earlier incidents. This change may be because the
internal situation became more alarming, due to the
rise of Ansar al-Shariah and the ability of these forces
to take and hold a number of Yemeni towns and small
cities throughout the Abyan and Shabwa provinces.
Yet, even Yemenis who detest AQAP have been quick
to maintain that innocent people have been accidentally killed by drones and that, at the very least, “tough
limitations” must be imposed on such systems if they
are to be used.220 This situation will be difficult for the
United States, since any serious mistake regarding col-
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lateral damage from drones could produce a domestic
backlash which Yemeni politicians would be reluctant
to ignore.221 Moreover, a variety of powerful Yemeni
politicians, including the radical Sunni cleric AbdulMajeed al-Zindani, have sharply criticized the use of
drones in Yemen and stand ready to take political advantage from any future incidents of collateral damage.222 Such politicians will almost certainly exaggerate
the number of innocents killed in strikes that involve
civilian deaths.
The military value of the drone strikes is difficult
to gauge, although the U.S. and international press
have published vast numbers of articles on individual strikes with drone launched Hellfire missiles. It is
not surprising that the press would latch on to such
drama, but drones do more than simply serve as missile platforms. They also can serve as key intelligence
platforms by virtue of their ability to linger over the
battlefield and other areas of intelligence interest. This
capability suggests that the drones are an important
enabler of the efficient use of ground forces as well
as missile platforms. In an offensive mode, drones
were also an asset for killing militants preparing to attack Yemeni military forces at checkpoints or in the
course of a battle. According to Yemeni news reports
cited by the New York Times, some militants were
killed by drones very shortly before they would have
undertaken operations against government forces,
including a few that were later found dead wearing
suicide vests.223
One of the most important drawbacks of drones is
their limited value as a strike weapon in circumstances where adequate intelligence about activities on the
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ground is not available. In Yemen, it can sometimes be
difficult to discern AQAP operatives from other individuals simply on the basis of overflights. This issue is
particularly problematic, since many Yemeni civilians
who have nothing to do with AQAP are armed, and
some tribal forces even have access to crew-served
weapons, including machine guns and mortars. The
obvious way to address this problem is through reliable intelligence which allows the drone operator
to discern which targets are innocent and which are
AQAP-affiliated. Nevertheless, intelligence is not always conclusive, and mistakes can be made. Gregory
Johnsen, a leading scholar on Yemen, is particularly
critical of drone use on these and other grounds. According to Johnsen, U.S. forces employing drones
were excessively reliant on information provided by
the Yemeni government under President Saleh, and
this information was not trustworthy.224 Johnsen also
maintains that significant numbers of Yemenis have
been radicalized by drone strikes that have killed innocent civilians on the basis of faulty intelligence.225
This problem is particularly serious with Yemenis
who have lost relatives in such strikes.
On balance, it appears that U.S. drone strikes in
Yemen are not going to stop in the foreseeable future.
While President Hadi and other Yemeni leaders may
have to accept the political heat for allowing such
strikes and deal with claims of collateral damage, this
may not be the most serious political problem that they
could have to address. A problem that would be even
more serious is an inadequate response to AQAP’s extensive assassination and bombing campaign. While
terrorism is usually not as grave a problem as an expanding insurgency, it is still a severe threat, which
has claimed the lives of a large number of Yemenis,
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and could again expand to the level of an insurgency.
The greatest value of drones may be that they can help
the United States achieve a satisfactory strategic outcome in Yemen and avoid factors that might lead to a
wider U.S. involvement in a Yemeni war. Additionally, while drone use has many political drawbacks, the
possibility that it helped determine the outcome of the
summer offensive is worth considering. If the Yemeni
military had been defeated by AQAP in this effort, the
government might have collapsed at an excruciatingly
sensitive time, possibly leaving the country in anarchy. Such a defeat would also have created the conditions for an even more deeply rooted AQAP presence
in southern Yemen, with no countervailing Yemeni
authority capable of moving against it. If Yemeni
forces had failed, and particularly if they had failed
ignominiously, a newly energized terrorist movement
could have plagued the region and the world.
THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE YEMENI
MILITARY AND THE ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE
The Yemeni military is in need of fundamental
reform if it is to become an effective force for guaranteeing Yemeni sovereignty and maintaining the stability of the country against AQAP and other radical
organizations. Earlier in this work, the success of the
Yemeni military in the spring 2012 offensive against
AQAP was noted. Driving AQAP from various contested southern provinces was an important victory,
but it was not the last word on Yemeni military effectiveness, since the military did not achieve this victory
alone. Yemeni military forces depended heavily on
hired tribal units and, according to the international
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press, also especially depended on U.S. airpower,
including drones.226 The use of U.S. drones to ensure
Yemeni security has already been seen to be unpopular among many Yemeni citizens and, under these circumstances, cannot be treated as a long-term solution
to that country’s security problems. Moreover, while
AQAP was driven from captured territory in the 2012
offensive, it remains a powerful force capable of a
wide range of aggressive actions against the Yemeni
government and its people. Military reform therefore remains a vital aspect of dealing with Yemen’s
security problems.
As part of the GCC plan for Yemeni transformation
under which President Hadi came to power, a military
committee was established and given the task of managing and reducing tensions within the military created by the effort to oust President Saleh. At that time,
military forces had become seriously divided between
pro-Saleh and anti-Saleh factions led by Brigadier
General Ahmed Saleh and Major General Ali Mohsen,
respectively. These factions viewed each other as enemies during the last year of the Saleh presidency and
became involved in occasional firefights on the streets
of Yemeni cities. Clearly, the legacy of such confrontations produced deep and painful divisions in the
military that would make it difficult to reestablish a
united force.
While still vice president, Hadi formed a 14-member military commission to help oversee the reform
and restructuring of the military and security forces,
with the goal of limiting factionalism and centralizing
presidential control of the military.227 During his inaugural speech in February, the new president stated that
his two top priorities were restructuring the armed
forces, and launching a national dialogue among Ye-
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meni civilian political factions. Many Yemenis seem to
believe that military restructuring centers on removing the former president’s relatives from important
military posts, and little else is needed. Removing any
untrustworthy officers is, of course, vital, but reform
cannot stop there. A more reasonable end state for a
reformed Yemeni military would be a well-equipped
capable force that is able to minimize factionalism to
the point that different units can work together effectively, and where competence trumps personal connections for promotions and key assignments. It is
also important to reduce corruption within the armed
forces, and ensure that lower ranking troops are paid
their full salaries in a timely way to avoid the need
for them to seek petty bribes while undertaking duties that place them in contact with the Yemeni public
(such as manning military checkpoints).
Most serious observers of the Yemeni military have
pointed out that throughout recent history each of the
Yemeni brigades has acted more like an independent
regionally-based militia loyal to its commander, rather
than a force loyal to the national government.228 Such
an observation is hardly surprising since the salaries
of Yemeni troops are sent to them from Sanaa through
their local commanders. If they are paid promptly
with minimal skimming, service members are particularly likely to view their regional commanders as
the central focus of their loyalty. Moreover, a number of commanders report the presence of “ghost soldiers” on their rosters. These service members do not
actually exist, but are paid monthly salaries that are
pocketed by senior brigade officers.229 This system of
warlord-style military units is an important target for
restructuring. Reformers suggest that Yemen needs
to break away from this type of system in favor of a
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unified army that safeguards national stability and
security and thereby boosts the Yemeni economy by
attracting sorely needed foreign aid, investment, and
tourism. If a centralized pay system that bypasses local commanders is possible, it could help ensure the
loyalty of these troops to the larger nation and prevent
them from being victimized by predatory officers.
Many Saleh loyalists remained in the military following their patron’s departure from the presidency,
but their numbers and influence have strongly diminished over time, with a series of reorganization measures taken by the new government. One of the first
officers that President Hadi removed from command
was General Mohammed Saleh, a half-brother of the
former president and commander of Yemen’s air force
for over 20 years. At the time of Hadi’s assumption of
office, thousands of air force officers and airmen had
been on strike for more than 2 months, closing down
a number of air bases in at least four provinces.230 The
central demand of the rebellious forces was to have
their commander removed. Air support for besieged
forces in southern Yemen became problematic, and
the general atmosphere of disorder within the military
became more pronounced. In March 2012, the air force
commander had pledged to relinquish this position in
response to Hadi’s orders, but he showed little movement toward doing so. It was also important to remove
him quickly, and the foot dragging created military
problems in pursing the struggle against AQAP.
General Mohammad Saleh was particularly detested for his leadership of the air force because many
of his subordinates believed that he was skimming
especially large amounts of money from funds designated to pay them, and was consequently responsible
for the serious disruption of their pay.231 In a famil-

67

iar pattern, General Saleh resisted political pressure
to leave office despite his previous promises to do so.
When President Hadi stopped waiting for his promised resignation and removed him from the position
of air force commander, he reacted by ordering troops
loyal to him to seize Sanaa’s main airport and force it
to close for a day.232 After this act of pique and defiance, General Saleh then backed down from a further
confrontation in the face of Hadi’s continued determination and the threat of court marshal for refusing
a lawful order.233 Additionally, UN Special Envoy to
Yemen Jamal Benomar seems to have made an effort
to convince both former President Saleh and his half
brother to end this challenge to Hadi’s authority in order to avoid sanctions directed at them personally.234
The mutiny ended when General Saleh left his position to become a high ranking but powerless aide to
the defense minister.235
Some of the more deeply entrenched Saleh loyalists
took longer to remove from key positions of power.
Former President Saleh’s son, Ahmed, retained command of the elite Republican Guard, until December
2012, when he was scheduled to lose his position as
a result of a planned merger of the Guard units into
other forces within the Defense Ministry. Hadi almost certainly was uncomfortable to have Ahmed retain this position for so long, but may also have been
concerned that immediately relieving him would introduce further divisions into the military at a point
when they could least afford them. Hadi, therefore,
eased Brigadier General Saleh out of his position of
power in stages beginning in August 2012. At that
time, he ordered a military reorganization which allowed Ahmed Saleh to retain his position as Republican Guard commander but seriously reduced the size
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and capabilities of the forces under his control.236 This
was done by transferring three brigades of the Republican Guard to the newly formed Presidential Protective Forces. The president also took some forces from
units loyal to General Ali Mohsen al-Amar in an apparent effort to show at least a little balance by drawing forces from commanders hostile to each other.237
The August move to reassign personnel from the
Republican Guard to Hadi’s direct control infuriated
many of Ahmed Saleh’s supporters within that organization. Hundreds of Republican Guard members
loyal to him surrounded the Defense Ministry shortly
after the military reorganization decree was made
public. These troops fired rifles and rocket-propelled
grenades at ministry guards, initiating a gun battle
that resulted in the deaths of two facility guards,
two civilians, and one attacker.238 In the immediate
aftermath of this battle, 62 officers and soldiers were
charged with mutiny and resisting authority. Later
additional arrests were made, and the number of individuals arrested for attacking the Defense Ministry
rose to 130.239 Hadi’s forceful reaction to the mutineers
met the need to maintain military discipline, but the
entire incident underscored the problems inherent
in making any decisive moves to engage in serious
command restructuring. Ahmed Saleh was never
publicly linked to the attack and was not charged for
conspiracy, incitement, or any other offense related to
it. Members of the Republican Guard who had been
arrested in the incident were variously charged with a
number of serious offenses. These included deserting
military posts, refusing orders, murder, and attempted murder. Ninety-three guardsmen were convicted
of offenses of some kind and given prison sentences
of 3 to 7 years.240 These sentences seemed remarkably
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light, considering the seriousness of the charges. Some
of the guardsmen were also acquitted.
Friction between President Hadi and Ahmed Saleh
erupted again in December 2012 over the custody of
Yemen’s SCUD missiles. Yemeni SCUDs have not
been equipped with chemical or other unconventional
warheads, and therefore serve only as a delivery system for a relatively small amount of high explosive ordinance. Despite these limitations, surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles are clearly a prestige weapon, and
Hadi’s order for the Republican Guard to turn them
over to the Defense Ministry was not well-received.
Initially, General Saleh refused to carry out the order,
and the disagreement between Hadi and Saleh was reported to be quite intense.241 After several days of confrontation, the Republican Guard commander backed
down and agreed to allow the Defense Ministry to
take custody of the missiles. The SCUD forces were
redesigned as the Missiles Group, which was considered a strategic reserve force.
The most serious blow to General Ahmed Saleh’s
standing was the previously noted abolition of the Republican Guard, announced in December 2012 shortly
after the SCUD confrontation by President Hadi’s office. Perhaps as something of a sweetener, General
Ali Moshin’s 1st Armored Brigade was also formally
abolished and was slated to have its troops transferred into newly reorganized units. The abolition of
the Republican Guard is an interesting and dramatic
step, although it is not clear how this will actually
occur or how long it will take. The head of Yemen’s
Military Study Center, Staff Brigadier Ali Naji Obaid,
stated somewhat cryptically that, “The unit labels
are done for, but the forces are still standing.”242 Also
somewhat unexpectedly, Ahmed Saleh publicly ac-
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cepted the decision to abolish the Republican Guard.
This acceptance may have been an act of military
professionalism, but it is also possible that he could
seek to implement the reorganization order in ways
that are slow, shallow, and reversible. Saleh remains a
general, and it is also possible that he will be transferred to a regional unit away from the levers of power
in Sanaa.243
Another important relative, former President
Saleh’s nephew, Brigadier General Yaya Mohammed
Abdullah Saleh, was retained in office as the commander of the Central Security Services (CSS) but
was demoted in May 2012, and then removed from
the CSS entirely in December 2012.244 Yaya was the
commander of the CSS until the May 21 suicide bombing, after which he was unable to retain that position
but was allowed to remain with his unit, serving as
Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander. Previously,
Yaya had stated that, as a professional soldier, he will
always remain loyal to the Republic, which means
supporting Hadi as the elected president. This stance
is laudable, but it may not be totally without guile.
Yaya is frequently rumored to be interested in running for president when Hadi’s 2-year transitionary
term expires in 2014. By stressing the need for respect
of republican principles, he avoids antagonizing the
opposition while not undermining potential backing
from his uncle’s supporters. Yaya continues to deny
interest in running for the presidency, but speculation
on this issue continues.245
Another Saleh nephew, Brigadier General Tareq
Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, lost his position as the
commander of the presidential guard immediately
following Hadi’s election. He was transferred to a
position as commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade,
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but this was not an appointment that Hadi wanted
to last for long. The 3rd Brigade is the most heavily
armed force of the Republican Guard, with troops
throughout Sanaa, and thus not a good place to assign
an untrustworthy commander.246 On April 6, 2012,
Tareq Saleh was reassigned as commander of the 37th
Armored Brigade in Hadramawt Province in southern Yemen.247 This posting was a much less politically
sensitive assignment, although it was much closer to
areas then contested by AQAP.
President Hadi has also made incremental but
significant efforts to restructure the leadership of the
military in response to military setbacks in the insurgency war with AQAP. On March 2, 2012, for example, he appointed Major General Salem Ali Qatan to
command the 31st Armored Brigade, replacing Saleh
loyalist Major General Mahdi Maqola. 248 This was not
a controversial move, since Maqola had been the commander of the southern region during the February
18 defeat by AQAP, and a number of his actions were
subject to severe criticism.249 Qatan, by contrast, went
on to play a leading role in the offensive that drove
AQAP from the territory it had captured the previous
year, although he was later assassinated by AQAP.
The future role of General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar
remains in question. Although he changed sides and
supported the demonstrators early in the Arab Spring
uprising, Ali Mohsin was for decades a powerful symbol of the old regime. He has also been an exceptionally powerful officer in the past, although he has been
careful not to appear interested in overshadowing
President Hadi. Ali Mohsin’s adept political maneuvering nevertheless did not save the most important
element of his power base when, in December 2012,
the 1st Armored Brigade was abolished along with
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the Republican Guard. As at least a quasi-ally of Hadi,
Ali Mohsin may have a potential for a political comeback and may also have had some ability to protect his
protégés within the military.
In addition to reducing military factionalism, Hadi
has emphasized the need to improve the basic combat
skills of the military. To achieve this goal, the president has strongly asserted that his country needs a
great deal of military aid from partner nations and
emphasized the need for this help on a number of occasions. Moreover, this aid does not simply involve
funding. The Yemeni military also needs assistance
in organization and training. The United States is one
of a number of countries helping Yemen meet these
military requirements. Hadi’s government remains in
continuing and detailed discussions with U.S. leaders
on the nature of such aid.
As the importance of Yemen has become increasingly clear to the West, so has U.S. military assistance
to that country. This aid had expanded from a modest $4.3 million in 2006 to $66.8 million in 2009,250 then
surged to $176 million in 2010, partially as a result of
the failed 2009 Christmas Day terrorist strike. Some
of these additional funds were used to purchase four
Huey II (UH-1H) helicopters and a CN-235-300 M fixed
wing transport aircraft.251 U.S. aid then dropped to
$30 million in 2011 as the aid relationship collapsed in
March, and the delivery of the helicopters and transport aircraft was also frozen.252
Under both Saleh and Hadi, U.S. military aid was
primarily used to upgrade and improve the weapons,
equipment, and training of the Yemeni forces. A sizeable amount of the U.S. aid was also directed at elite
counterterrorism units and aviation assets. To further
support Yemen, President Obama significantly and
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publicly increased intelligence support for that country until the March 2011 massacre of civilian demonstrators by Saleh’s security services.253 After the March
crisis, Saleh seemed to hope that his problems with
the United States aid suspension would be temporary
and that the aid relationship might be reestablished as
a result of U.S.-Yemeni cooperation on some terrorism issues, including finding and eliminating terrorist
leader Anwar al-Awlaki. Saleh also sent limited numbers of his elite troops to fight against AQAP in the
south, but would not allow the transfer of too many
of them due to the ongoing power struggle in Sanaa.
In June 2011, a Yemeni government spokesman confirmed that U.S.-trained counterterrorism troops affiliated with the Central Security Forces had deployed
against opposition tribesmen.254
President Saleh’s resignation and Hadi’s assumption of Yemen’s presidency allowed the United States
to restore direct assistance to the Yemeni military
which was begun gradually, with a special emphasis
on units involved in the fight against AQAP.255 Hadi’s
willingness to conduct a military offensive to evict
AQAP from its southern strongholds impressed the
U.S. leadership, and suggested that the new president
was committed to a strong partnership in fighting terrorism. The United States is particularly interested in
helping the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) which has
previously benefited from U.S. aid and training. The
United States also remains interested in helping the
Yemenis maintain and upgrade their military helicopters and fixed wing aircraft so that elite troops can be
quickly transported to areas where they are needed.
Some support for rebuilding the Yemeni military
has also been provided by friendly Arab countries.
The GCC has provided extensive funding for military
assistance, but the most active Arab participant in Ye74

meni issues has been Jordan. The Jordanians also have
a long history of cooperating with Gulf Arab states
in working against radical organizations, including
al-Qaeda and its various branches. Jordan maintains
one of the finest armies in the Arab world, and it also
has excellent, although low-technology, intelligence
services. The Amman leadership has shown considerable interest in sharing its national security expertise
through continuing cooperation with the Yemenis
against AQAP, which the Jordanians also regard as an
enemy. Talks on anti-terrorist cooperation date back
to the Saleh regime and have continued at high levels
under Hadi.256
Jordan has been working with the United States to
provide expertise in the restructuring of the Yemeni
military, particularly the army, including providing
recommendations of “best practices” for the military
restructuring.257 A Jordanian military committee has
also been deeply involved in providing recommendations to the Yemeni Defense Ministry and the Interior
Ministry. Yemeni General Riyadh al-Qirshi has stated
that the Jordanian committee, “includes a broad range
of security experts who specialize in reorganizing
public sector and military systems.”258 Jordan has also
offered to help retrain the Yemeni military and expand
the military ties between the two countries. This cooperation includes counterterrorism training at the King
Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) which had already occurred on a limited basis
dating back to the Saleh regime.259 This center was designed with U.S. assistance to help improve the military skills of Arab students, including non-Jordanians
attending courses there.260 KASOTC became fully
operational on May 20, 2009, in a ceremony presided
over by the Jordanian king. 261 Jordanian programs to
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train Yemenis at this facility will also have the advantage of reducing or eliminating language and cultural
problems between Yemenis and their trainers.
It is also possible that Yemeni military forces could
benefit from increased combined exercises with other
Arab states and even peacekeeping training. Again,
the role of Jordan could be useful in teaching Yemen
troops how to address some security problems, with
minimum force being directed at the population in
conflict areas. While the Jordanian approach to this
issue specializes in international peacekeeping, some
of the principles used in an international environment
may be relevant to various trouble spots in southern
Yemen. Jordan maintains a Peacekeeping Operations
Center based in Zarqa. Statistics from 2010 indicate
that 61,000 Jordanian troops have participated in
peacekeeping operations in 18 conflict areas, and this
mission remains ongoing.262 Such experience gives the
Jordanians a wealth of information that the Yemenis
may find useful. Since Jordan is not a wealthy country, funding from the United States, the EU, wealthy
Arab states, or elsewhere would be needed to move
forward on such efforts.
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS FOR
LANDPOWER, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The security problems in Yemen, including the
continued threat of AQAP, will not be resolved easily
and will require a serious commitment of resources by
a number of concerned countries to be effective. Moreover, it is difficult to solve the AQAP problem in any
fundamental way without corresponding progress
in managing the other difficulties in Yemen. President Obama’s statement that he has “no intention” of
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sending combat troops (beyond military advisors and
trainers) to Yemen is reassuring to most Yemenis, and
indicates reasonable concern over the danger of being
drawn into a significant military intervention that will
almost certainly create more problems than it solves.
Such an intervention would consume U.S. lives and
resources and could only make the security situation
in the region increasingly unstable, due to an inevitable nationalist backlash. This set of problems does not
suggest that the United States can remain aloof from
Yemen’s problems. Rather, it requires that Washington’s involvement in Yemen must be structured in
ways that the political culture will accept.
U.S. support for Yemen remains important, and
the United States must not regard the fight against
AQAP as largely over because of the defeat of their
insurgent forces in the south. This analysis has shown
that AQAP remains a dangerous and effective force
despite these setbacks. There are also important reasons for defeating AQAP and its allies in Yemen, even
if this does not destroy the organization and instead
leads it to move operations to prospective sanctuaries in other remote parts of the world. Yemen is one
of the worst places on earth to cede to terrorists due
to its key strategic location, including a long border
with Saudi Arabia. It also dominates one of the region’s key waterways, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait which
controls access to the southern Red Sea. Furthermore,
the problem of Yemen based-terrorism remains an important international threat which cannot be ignored,
as indicated by repeated AQAP efforts to attack the
U.S. homeland.
Unfortunately, the Yemeni political system is likely to remain unstable, and the economic system is virtually certain to remain impoverished for some time.
Central governmental authority in the hinterland can
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be expected to remain limited for the foreseeable future. Within this especially difficult milieu, this report
makes the following recommendations:
1. The United States must strongly support the
transitional government of President Hadi as long
as he continues to stand firmly against AQAP, and
as long as the Yemeni government adheres to a proreform agenda, including a firm commitment to a
new democratic constitution. This effort will involve
both military and civilian aid. Some segments of the
Yemeni population are particularly suspicious that
the United States cares nothing about Yemen except
for the fight against AQAP. Superficially, that may
appear to be the case, but U.S. military leaders have
a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of
counterinsurgency, including the fact that over time
you cannot be better at counterinsurgency than the
government you support. U.S. aid, including military
aid, must therefore continue to be grounded in an understanding of Yemeni political culture, and the importance of reform.
2. The United States must not seek to Americanize
the struggle against AQAP, and should avoid sending major ground combat units to Yemen. However
bad the situation may become there, appearing to
Americanize the war against AQAP can only make it
dramatically worse. Yemeni public opposition to the
presence of foreign ground troops with combat missions is almost universal, and it is possible that large
elements of the Yemeni public would rise against their
president and parliament if the government invited
the United States to provide such forces. Certainly,
Yemen’s Islamic clergy can be particularly shrill on
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this subject, and this intensity goes far beyond wellknown radicals such as Sheikh Zindani.
3. U.S. leadership needs to avoid viewing the U.S.
drone program as a panacea for terrorism and insurgency problems in Yemen. While this report does not
recommend discontinuing drone use over Yemen, it
does urge the U.S. leadership to consider drone use
to be a limited term solution for efforts to deal with
AQAP. The long-term solution must be a reformed
Yemeni military that can address problems, such as
AQAP, without the need for any direct U.S. military
intervention, including the use of armed drones. In
this regard, the nature and extent of the drone program anywhere in the world can provoke a strong
local backlash. Correspondingly, drones cannot be
viewed as a “cost-free” form of warfare despite their
advantages. As previously noted, widespread journalistic coverage of the use of these systems in Yemen
suggests a continuing high level of Yemeni public
discontent about the program even if the discontent
is currently manageable by the Yemeni government.
It is also of tremendous importance that the United
States avoid civilian casualties resulting from drone
strikes to the greatest extent possible. This priority is
not simply a humanitarian concern. The tribal nature
of Yemen ensures that any civilian casualty will have
a number of living relatives and fellow tribesmen who
will never forgive such an assault. These people could
be encouraged to join AQAP in direct response to the
deaths of any innocents with whom they feel kinship.
4. U.S. policymakers should encourage the Yemeni
government to continue supporting local anti-AQAP
Resistance Councils, provided they share a similar
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agenda to the government. Many southern Yemeni
tribes and individuals continue to hold grudges against
AQAP for the brutal ways in which they behaved in
2010-12 when they occupied and administered territory in key southern provinces. There also exists a
strong secular trend, at least in the urban areas of the
south, and nostalgia for the socialist system that existed before 1990. That regime, for all its many crimes
and shortcomings, is remembered as providing for the
poor and needy, albeit with extensive Soviet bloc aid
that artificially kept the economy afloat. Southerners,
correspondingly, are not likely to embrace AQAP ideology in large numbers unless it is their only alternative. Moreover, as in 2012, many southern tribesmen
and villagers will continue to fight against AQAP as
tribal auxiliaries provided that they do not view the
government of Yemen as worse than AQAP.
5. It would be useful for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to share both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism lessons learned in Iraq with the Yemeni
military, through a variety of interactions. The use of
the Iraqi Awakening Councils seems to parallel the
development of the Yemeni Resistance Councils to the
point that a good consideration of the problems and
advantages of Iraq could help Yemenis understand
how to best conduct their own operations. Some of the
lessons of the Awakening Groups in Iraq might be applied to the tribal organizations in Yemen. U.S. Army
officers familiar with the lessons of the Iraqi Awakening Groups might make particularly good advisors for
the Yemeni military. One particularly important way
that the United States could help Yemen is to give
them advice about vetting potential applicants for service in these organizations. Additionally, advice from
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U.S. sources on comprehensive counterinsurgency efforts and strategies which go beyond simply defeating insurgents could be particularly valuable.263 U.S.
advisors might find it useful to emphasize how winning over the population can yield numerous military
advantages such as an increased flow of high quality
intelligence.
6. The United States should help Yemen rebuild
its air force (including rotary and fixed-wing components) after the 2011-12 mutiny and other problems
that it has experienced. In particular, the U.S. Army
may be called upon to help train and support Yemeni
use of assault and transport helicopters. Such systems
are often exceptionally important for counterinsurgency. The Yemenis are also expected to receive additional transport aircraft such as C-130s. These systems
are likely to be extremely useful in carrying troops,
especially elite counterterrorism troops, as quickly
as possible to places where they are needed. The Yemeni military should also be provided with militarily
significant numbers of its own drones, even if these
systems are not the most advanced systems available.
The use of drones in Yemen is much more acceptable
to the population if these drones are Yemeni rather
than U.S. assets.
7. U.S. policymakers must continue supporting
Yemeni government efforts to fight AQAP with intelligence, training, and military equipment, so long as
Yemeni leaders continue to display a willingness to
carry on the fight. So far, the United States has been
highly effective in tailoring its military aid to Yemen
in ways that focus on the needs of the counter al-Qaeda mission. Should AQAP be able to reestablish itself

81

as a powerful insurgent force, the United States will
have to expand aid in ways that remain oriented on
counterinsurgency. The United States will then have
to do everything possible to avoid becoming viewed
as a party to Yemen’s other conflicts, such as the periodic fighting between the Yemeni government and
the Houthi rebels in the north.
8. The United States must structure its military
support to Yemen in ways that continue to support a
long-term military relationship between the two countries, but that also expose the Yemenis to U.S. concepts
of military professionalism. Such an approach would
include particular vigilance in providing ongoing opportunities for Yemeni officers to train in the United
States in programs such as Professional Military Education (PME) courses. Such courses give international
officers an opportunity to forge close relationships
with American officers and to consider the importance
of respect for human rights within a military context.
9. U.S. leaders must be aware of the serious and escalating possibility of a humanitarian crisis occurring
in Yemen. They must also seek ways to address this
crisis without deploying large numbers of U.S. Army
or Marine forces, if this is at all possible. If U.S. military forces must be deployed, efforts must be made to
project as light a footprint as possible. Moreover, any
U.S. organizations involved in humanitarian relief
need to be aware that weak government institutions
and endemic corruption will make it difficult to work
with the government to implement a meaningful and
efficient aid program.
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10. The expansion of good governance and anticorruption measures in Yemen is vital to that country’s
future, and any U.S. efforts to encourage and support
these efforts may be useful. The United States has not
been able to halt the rampant corruption in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, and it cannot be expected to
implement fundamental changes in Yemen. Nevertheless, ways need to be found to reduce corruption to the
point that the intentions of important international aid
projects are not subverted, and military forces do not
have their efficiency undermined by corrupt practices.
11. The United States should support the work of
effective and trustworthy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Yemen. The United States cannot
solve the problem of AQAP operations in Yemen with
development aid administered by U.S. personnel,
but it can certainly encourage and support the work
of responsible NGOs and ask other developed countries to do the same. Their role is vital, since there are
relatively few individuals in the Yemeni government
who can impartially administer well-funded development programs. Such programs will have to address a
myriad of economic problems in order to help Yemen
in any meaningful way. Programs to help address the
severe and rising problem of unemployment, particularly among young people, may be especially important. The Yemeni bureaucracy is not up to many of
the tasks associated with development, since it is both
riddled with internal problems and maintains only a
limited ability to operate outside of Sanaa. This situation greatly magnifies the importance of NGOs.
12. As in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States
will have to be tolerant of the Yemeni government’s
willingness to pardon and rehabilitate former mem83

bers of AQAP who have not been involved in international terrorism and show good prospects for remaining outside of terrorist groups in the future. The
Yemeni government also has to be careful about who
it accepts into military service and service in the popular committees. Since many Yemeni fighters join radical organizations for pay rather than ideology, these
people could stop being a problem if their energies
can be directed elsewhere. Nevertheless, true radicals
could also attempt to infiltrate Yemeni security organizations, and Yemeni leaders must guard against this
danger.
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